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This thesis is an empirical and theoretical analysis of the impact of financing con­
straints on firm-level investment behaviour. Its primary objectives are to model 
this impact, and to test the restrictions these models place on the data. Chapter 1  
contains a discussion of these themes, and provides an overview of the thesis. Chap­
ter 2  addresses the empirical question of whether innovative firms are financially 
constrained. To answer this question, several structural investment equations are 
tested, and the sensitivity of physical investment expenditures to internal finance 
is compared across innovative and non-innovative firms. The investment expendi­
tures of innovative firms are found to be more sensitive to cash flow than those of 
non-innovative firms. These results support the hypothesis that innovative firms 
are financially constrained. The third chapter builds a theoretical model to ex­
plain a widely reported fact in the inventory literature, which is that the variance 
of production exceeds the variance of sales. This fact contradicts a prediction of 
the standard Linear-Quadratic model of inventory investment, and for this reason 
is often referred to as the “excess variance of production” puzzle. In this chapter, a 
model of inventory investment is built. It is shown that when financing constraints 
are imposed on the model, it can explain the excess variance of production puzzle. 
In the absence of these constraints, the model does, not deliver this result. The 
fourth chapter returns to the theme of identifying financially constrained firms. A 
weakness of existing tests of financing constraints is that they are not both direct 
and structural. This chapter addresses that criticism by constructing a model of 
investment from which is derived a simple and direct, structural test of the null 
hypothesis that a group of firms is financially constrained. The test is implemented 
on a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms. The results support the findings of existing 
tests.
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This thesis is comprised of three essays which model and test the impact of financing 
constraints on firm level investment behaviour.
Chapter 2  is an application of the testing methodology currently predominant in the 
empirical literature on financing constraints. It addresses the question of whether 
firms which are innovative, i.e. those that devote resources towards the development 
of new products or production processes, are more likely to be financially constrained 
than non-innovative firms. Although on theoretical grounds innovative firms are nat­
ural candidates to face large cost premia on external finance, most empirical studies 
have shown that R&D expenditures are surprisingly insensitive to fluctuations in 
internal finance. However, this insensitivity may be due to technological reasons. 
Consequently, Chapter 2  examines the behaviour of the physical capital investment 
of innovative and non-innovative firms. The empirical results can be interpreted as 
evidence that innovative firms do face binding financing constraints.
Chapter 3 is a purely theoretical analysis, devoted to the explanation of an empir­
ical puzzle in the inventory literature. A robust and widely reported fact is that 
the variance of a firm’s production is greater than the variance of its sales. This 
contradicts a prediction of the standard model of inventories, the Linear-Quadratic 
model. Chapter 3 builds a model of inventory investment, and shows that when 
financing constraints are imposed, the model can explain this puzzle.
9
Introduction 10
The testing methodology employed in Chapter 2 has several weaknesses. These 
weaknesses, discussed in the next section of this introduction, are addressed in Chap­
ter 4. In that chapter, a structural model of investment is constructed from which 
a direct test for capital market imperfections can be derived. The test is based on 
theoretical results regarding the economic exogeneity of the firm’s cash flow, and 
takes the form of a simple Granger causality test. As this test is both a direct 
test of financing constraints, and is derived explicitly from a structural model, it is 
not subject to the same criticisms made of existing tests. In the latter part of the 
chapter the test is performed on a panel of US manufacturing firms. The results 
are identical to those reported in the majority of papers in the empirical literature 
on financing constraints. The null hypothesis that financing constraints are binding 
fails to be rejected for firms classified a priori as financially constrained. For other 
firms, the hypothesis is rejected.
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief survey of the literature in two areas. 
In the first section, the empirical literature on financing constraints is reviewed, and 
the strengths and weaknesses of various tests discussed. In the second section, the 
the empirical and theoretical literature on inventory investment is reviewed.
1.1 Testing for Capital Market Imperfections: M ethodolog­
ical Issues
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, theoretical developments in the field of asymmetric infor­
mation were applied to the study of capital markets. A series of papers demonstrated 
that the presence of asymmetric information in these markets would force firms to 
pay a premium for external sources of finance . 1 In extreme circumstances, access 
to external finance may even be rationed or prohibited altogether. Participants in 
these markets were thought to face a “hierarchy of finance” in which internal finance 
was cheaper than external finance, and perhaps where the costs of different forms
1For a review of the theoretical literature on asymmetric information and capital markets, see 
Freixas and Rochet (1997).
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of external finance differed as well. The key empirical prediction of these models is 
that fluctuations in internal finance will affect investment expenditures through a 
“supply of finance” channel, in addition to the standard “demand” channel in which 
the fluctuations proxy for changes in the set of investment opportunities facing the 
firm.
The intuition behind this prediction is illustrated in Figure 1.1. In that figure, 
the supply of finance schedule is perfectly elastic up to the point where the firm 
exhausts its internal sources of finance at X .  The cost of internal finance, r, is the 
appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate at which, in a perfect capital market, finance 
would be provided. At X  the supply schedule becomes upward-sloping to reflect 
the cost premium on external finance . 2  The demand schedule is drawn such that 
the financing constraint is binding. That is, the firm actually spends / c, whereas it 
would have spent I* had it not been constrained.
The equilibrium in this market is a function of two exogenous disturbances: a de­
mand shock and a supply shock 77. For generality, it is assumed that the former 
shock shifts the supply curve through its affect on current period profits. The latter 
shock may be interpreted as a cash windfall, i.e. a shock to the firm’s current profits 
which contains no information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities. The 
shocks are assumed to be orthogonal.
If capital markets are perfect, then only shifts in the demand schedule cause changes 
in investment expenditures . 3  However, as can be seen from Figure 1, if capital 
markets are imperfect then shifts in the supply schedule will also affect investment. 
In these circumstances, the demand shock affects investment through two channels: 
the “demand” channel represented by shifts in the demand curve, and the “supply” 
channel, shown by shifts in the supply curve. Also in these circumstances, the pure 
supply shock, 77, will affect investment spending.
2For the purposes of this discussion, the shape of the supply curve is unimportant. W hat matter 
is that it is not perfectly elastic.






Figure 1.1: The Identification Problem
Viewed from this perspective, it can be seen that in order to provide conclusive 
evidence on capital market imperfections, shifts in the supply of finance schedule 
first must be identified. The main criticism of the existing empirical papers on 
financing constraints is directed at the weaknesses in the identification techniques 
they have employed. Indeed, many of the papers in this literature do not directly 
address the identification problem. For the purposes of critically reviewing this 
literature, papers are classified into the following four groups: (i), indirect reduced- 
form tests, (ii), indirect structural tests, (iii), direct reduced-form tests, and (iv), 
direct structural tests . 4
The first type of test was used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), the paper 
which spawned the modern empirical literature on financing constraints . 5 In this
4For more comprehensive reviews of the empirical literature on financing constraints, see Hub­
bard (1997) and Schiantarelli (1996). For a review of the empirical investment literature, see 
Chirinko (1993).
5There are some earlier empirical studies on the importance of financial determinants of invest-
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test, reduced-form investment regressions are run. Variables such as Tobin’s q, 
Jorgenson’s user cost of capital, or first differences in sales are used to control for 
shifts in investment demand, while variables such as cash flow are used to capture 
the effect of shifts in the supply of finance schedule. As no formal attem pt is made 
to identify movements in the two schedules, any economic interpretation of the 
coefficients in these regressions will be ambiguous. This is the main objection to 
this technique. In these regressions, it is unclear the extent to which variables such 
as cash flow are proxying for shifts in the demand schedule.
However, inference in this technique is not based upon the coefficients themselves, 
but rather upon a comparison of their magnitudes across different classes of firms. 
The justification for this inference is similar to that used in classical experiment 
design. That is, if a sample firms can be stratified according to a specific criterion, 
then differences in the regression results across strata can be attributed to the dif­
ferences identified by the stratification criterion. The criteria that have been used 
are variables which, it is argued, will separate firms according to whether or not 
the assumptions underlying the hypothesis of perfect capital markets are violated. 
Variables which have been used include firm size, firm age, existence of a bond or 
commercial paper rating, and the values taken by certain ratios such as dividends 
to earnings.
The difficulty with comparing reduced-form coefficients across classes is that unlike 
in classical experiment design, it is impossible to ensure that those determinants 
which are not controlled for by the design of the experiment have identical distri­
butions for all classes of firms. Certain structural items may differ systematically 
between groups. For example, the stochastic process governing demand for the 
“group-average” firm’s output may differ across groups. As reduced-form coefficients 
are functions of underlying structural parameters, a version of the Lucas critique 
is applicable here. These parameters must either be controlled for, as in classical 
experiments, or identified in the regressions themselves. If neither is done, then it
ment expenditures, most notably Meyer and Kuh (1957).
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remains unclear the extent to which the difference in reduced-form coefficients can 
be explained by differences in the values of structural parameters, as opposed to 
differences in premia on external finance.
In response to these criticisms, subsequent research focused on estimating structural 
investment equations, all of which were based on the neoclassical Adjustment Costs 
model of investment under the assumption of perfect capital markets (Eisner and 
Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967), Gould (1968)). Two structural equations can be derived 
from this model: the q equation, and an Euler equation . 6  If all of the assumptions 
underlying the derivation of these equations are valid, then the restrictions they 
place on the data will not be rejected. These include restrictions on which variables 
should enter the regression significantly, the signs of their coefficients, restrictions on 
the relative magnitudes of the coefficients (within a group), and over-identification 
restrictions. The second group of papers test these restrictions.
Like the first test, this test does not attem pt to directly identify shifts in the supply 
curve. The goal of this test is to isolate the reasons why structural restrictions may 
be rejected by the data for a certain sample of firms. To do this many of these 
papers also stratify their samples . 7  However, unlike the first test, these regressions 
are structural and therefore not subject to the Lucas critique.
In an attem pt to identify the causes of rejection, these papers introduced modifica­
tions to the basic Adjustment Costs model. Some papers focused on the q equation, 
still using market value data to measure q. For example, Blundell, Bond, Devereux, 
and Schiantarelli (1992), addressed the issues of econometric endogeneity and mea­
surement error by directly examining the conditions under which lags (and leads) of 
q were valid instruments. Hayashi and Inoue (1991) modified the model to allow for 
heterogeneity in capital stock. Their estimation technique explicitly perm itted the 
coefficient on q to vary over tim e . 8  Finally, Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990)
6See the appendix of Chapter 2 for a derivation of these equations.
N evertheless, not all papers in this group use stratified samples. Notable exceptions are Blun­
dell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994).
8This coefficient is a function of the market rate of interest, and therefore will vary. Most
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relaxed the assumption of perfect competition, by assuming that the firm operates 
in a monopolistically competitive product market. All of these papers report that 
certain restrictions implied by their respective structural models were rejected, at 
least for a sub-sample of firms.
Other papers focused on tests of the Adjustment Costs model which do not rely on 
market data to formulate q. One group of papers test the Euler equation of the 
adjustment costs model. Bond and Meghir (1994) and Whited (1992) and Hubbard, 
Kashyap, and Whited (1995) both found that the data rejected certain restrictions 
implied by their versions of the model. Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995), tested the q equation without using market data to construct 
q.9 Both these papers found that the Adjustment Costs model was nevertheless 
rejected.
Although these papers test structural equations, they do not directly test the hy­
pothesis that capital markets are imperfect. Despite the modifications of the Ad­
justment Costs model made by many of the papers in the literature, all of their null 
hypotheses are still joint hypotheses . 1 0  Thus, when the model is rejected in the data 
for a particular group of firms, it is impossible to identify which assumption has 
been violated. Consequently, one is forced to used reduced-form evidence, such as 
that provided by the first test, in support of the argument that the perfect capital 
markets assumption has been violated. In contrast, if one of the assumptions in the 
joint hypothesis was that capital markets were imperfect, then a failure to reject the 
null would be unambiguous evidence of financing constraints.
The pitfalls of using the indirect structural test of the second technique axe illus­
trated by the model in Chapter 4, and that in Caballero and Leahy (1996). Both
studies include time dummies to partially account for interest rate changes.
9Under certain conditions, marginal q can be expressed as the expected present discounted value 
of the cash flow-capital ratio. Using standard techniques for predicting geometric distributed lags, 
(see Sargent (1987), p .303) marginal q can be estimated from company accounts data.
10Some other assumptions included in these hypotheses in addition to that of perfect capital 
markets are the linear homogeneity of certain functions, no fixed costs of adjustment, and the 
stationarity of the stochastic processes governing structural disturbances.
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models show that when some of the assumptions of the Adjustment Costs model 
are changed, but the perfect capital markets assumption retained, then average q 
is no longer the only sufficient statistic for investment. Other variables, such as 
the cash flow-capital ratio, are sufficient statistics as well. Moreover, under more 
general assumptions on the stochastic processes of the exogenous shocks, neither q 
nor cash flow are sufficient statistics. In other words, both variables would enter a 
“q equation” regression significantly, despite there being perfect capital markets. In 
this case, it is the failure of assumptions other than that of perfect capital markets 
which has lead to the rejection of the standard Adjustment Costs model.
Despite their weaknesses, Chapter 2  is an application of the first two tests to a sample 
of UK firms. The sample has been divided into innovative and non-innovative firms. 
Both the Euler equation and the q equation of the Adjustment Costs model are 
tested on each sub-sample. Each of these equations is rejected in each sub-sample. 
Thus, using the second test one cannot distinguish between the two groups of firms. 
However, the investment expenditures of innovative firms are significantly more 
sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow than those of non-innovative firms. Using the 
arguments of the first test, this is interpreted as evidence that innovative firms are 
financially constrained.
The third group of papers addresses the weakness of the indirect structural test by 
attempting to identify 77, the shocks which shift only the supply curve. If capital 
markets are imperfect then 77, or variables which are only a function of 77, will enter 
significantly into an investment regression. Thus, these papers directly test the 
hypothesis of imperfect capital markets by testing the significance of these variables 
in reduced-form investment equations.
The difference between the first test and this test is that the papers using the latter 
attem pt to identify observable variables which are functions only of 77. For example, 
Blanchard, Lopez-de Silanes, and Schleifer (1994) use data on the receipt of wind­
falls from court judgements. Lamont (1997) uses data from diversified oil companies. 
He argues that shocks to the cash flow of oil-related activities can be interpreted as 
supply of finance shocks for the investment expenditures of non-oil activities. Hub­
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bard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995) use tax payments as an instrument for cash flow. 
Froot and Stein (1991) use exchange-rate shocks to the internal finance of multi­
national firms. Finally, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) use the co-movement between 
investment in working capital and physical capital to identify 77. All of these papers 
found that investment was positively correlated with their chosen proxies for rj.
However, these papers share the generic weakness of reduced-form tests, which is 
that they do not identify 77 in a structural economic model. Consequently, they 
are subject to the same reservations as the original Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988), namely that there is no theoretical argument supporting the assertion that 
the chosen data items are independent of the fi shock. In the absence of an economic 
model, one still cannot be certain as to what interpretation to give to the coefficients 
of the variables chosen to proxy for 77. Moreover, the stricter is the criteria for 
selecting such variables, the smaller the sample becomes on which the final test is 
run. This makes it more difficult to argue that capital market imperfections are 
widespread enough to be of importance.
The final type of test is both direct and structural. As such, it is not subject to the 
same criticisms made of the first three types of test. Since the test is structural, cross­
group comparisons can be made. Since it is direct, failure to reject its null hypothesis 
can be interpreted unambiguously as evidence of capital market imperfections.
Some papers in the financing constraints literature have imposed financing con­
straints on the Adjustment Costs model in an attem pt to derive structural variables 
which are affected by the underlying shocks only through the “supply channel” . The 
most obvious example of such a variable is the Lagrange Multiplier on the financing 
constraint. The Lagrange Multiplier enters both the first-order condition and the 
Euler equation only when the financing constraint is binding, or is expected to bind. 
Thus, if the Multiplier were an observable variable, it could be used as the basis of 
a direct structural test. But that is the problem with this approach. The multiplier 
is not observable. In order for the test to be structural, the Multiplier must be
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explicitly expressed in terms of observable variables . 1 1 Tests which use proxies for 
the Lagrange Multiplier, such as Whited (1992), Hubbard, Kashyap, and W hited 
(1995), and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) are not structural.
Chapter 4 of this thesis is the only paper which currently falls into this category 
of test. In that chapter, a slightly different approach to the identification prob­
lem is taken. Rather than identifying 77, and testing the sensitivity of investment 
expenditures to this shock, this chapter specifies conditions in the context of an in­
vestment model under which it is possible to identify 77. It is shown that if financing 
constraints always bind, these conditions are not satisfied. If, on the other hand, 
financing constraints never bind, the conditions are satisfied, and 77 can be identified 
using a restriction first employed in Blanchard and Quah (1989). These theoretical 
results place a testable restriction on the VAR representation for certain observable 
variables generated by the investment model. This permits an extremely simple test 
of the null hypothesis that a group of firms is financially constrained.
As was mentioned previously, the vast majority of papers in this literature find ev­
idence of capital market perfections. Currently, there are only two papers which 
find evidence to the contrary: Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cummins, Has- 
sett, and Oliner (1997). Both these papers make an important contribution to the 
literature by providing results which demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of the 
reduced-form tests discussed above. However, it is equally true that both papers 
suffer from precisely these same weaknesses. As a result, they do not bring us closer 
to understanding whether or not capital market imperfections exist. The debate 
over the existence of potential imperfections in capital markets will continue until 
evidence based on direct structural tests is discovered. Chapter 4 is a first step in 
this direction.
n For example, the equivalence of marginal q, an unobservable variable, with average qy an 
observable variable, is explicitly derived under certain restrictions of the Adjustment Costs model 
under perfect capital markets.
Introduction 19
1.2 Financing Constraints and Inventory Investm ent
The theoretical literature on inventory investment is dominated by models which 
are based on real as opposed to financial factors. However, there axe several stylised 
facts concerning inventories which suggest that capital market frictions may play an 
im portant role in our understanding of the determinants of inventory investment. 
The first of these is the role inventories play in accounting for business cycles. In 
developed countries, inventory disinvestment typically accounts for about 50% of 
the declines in aggregate output during post-war recessions. 1 2  This is true despite 
the fact that the stock of inventories accounts for only about 1 % of the level of 
aggregate output in a given year.
A growing body of theoretical research in macroeconomics emphasizes the potential 
for capital market imperfections to explain both the magnitude and persistence 
of fluctuations in aggregate output . 1 3  However, these theories typically abstract 
away from inventory investment. Given the importance of inventories in accounting 
for fluctuations in aggregate output, it is a natural step to analyse the impact of 
financing constraints on firm level inventory investment.
This direction for research becomes more tightly focused when one considers another 
stylised fact about inventories, which is that sales and inventory investment are 
positively correlated . 1 4  An implication of this fact is that the variance of production 
exceeds the variance of sales . 1 5  This can be seen from the accounting identity 
yt =  st +  A 72*, where yt is production, st is sales, and nt is the stock of inventories. 
From this equation we get var(y) =  var(s) +  var(An)  +  cov(s, An).
12For US data see Blanchard and Fischer (1989), and Blinder and Maccini (1991). For data from 
other developed countries, see Ramey and West (1998).
13See for example Kiyotaki and Moore (1995), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler (1992), 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
14This fact is manifested in aggregate data by the procyclicality of inventory investment, a 
fact which has lead some economists to speculate on whether inventory investment is a source of 
destabilization.
15This fact is very widely reported. See, for example, Blinder and Maccini (1991) or Ramey and 
West (1998).
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The standard model of inventories, the Linear-Quadratic Model (Holt et al. (I960)), 
predicts exactly the opposite. In that model firms hold inventories in order to 
smooth production. This implies that the variance of production is lower than 
the variance of sales. Moreover, the production smoothing prediction rests on very 
weak assumptions, the main one being a convex cost function. For these reasons 
this stylised fact is often referred to as the “excess variance of production” puzzle.
Chapter 3 shows that this puzzle can be explained by the effect of capital market 
imperfections on inventory investment. The intuition behind this explanation is 
very similar to the intuition of the “financial accelerator” underlying many macro 
models of business cycles. Following below average sales realisation, financially 
constrained firms do not have sufficient funds to replace all the units which were 
sold, and consequently “under-invest” in inventories. Conversely, following a high 
sales realisation firms are in a financial position to “over-invest” . It is this behaviour 
which leads inventory investment to be positively correlated with sales, and hence 
explains the excess variance of production puzzle.
Accelerator motives are very common in the inventory literature . 1 6  They axe usu­
ally derived from the interaction of a costly adjustment technology (of the stock 
of inventories), and inventory target levels based on sales expectations. However, 
structural estimates of the costs of adjusting the stock of inventories are implausibly 
high . 1 7  The model of Chapter 3 can be viewed as an additional source of accelerator 
effects. A possible explanation of the high estimates of adjustment costs is that they 
reflect the interaction of both technological and financial frictions to adjustment.
Thus, one motivation for Chapter 3 is that it provides a link between a strand the 
macro literature on business cycles, and an explanation of the observed behaviour of 
one the most im portant components of fluctuations in aggregate output. However, 
there is also considerable empirical motivation for the theory of inventory invest­
ment presented in that chapter. The empirical literature on inventories provides
16 A very early contribution is Metzler (1941).
17See Blinder and Maccini (1991) and Ramey and West (1998).
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quite limited support for existing explanations of the excess variance of production 
puzzle . 1 8  For example, one way to explain the puzzle is to introduce cost shocks into 
the Linear-Quadratic model (e.g. Eichenbaum (1989)). However, there is very little 
evidence which shows that observable cost shocks, such as shocks to real wages or 
interest rates, have a significant effect on inventory investment (Ramey and West 
(1998)). An alternative explanation is that the cost function is non-convex (e.g. 
Ramey (1991)). Yet many studies find that estimated cost functions are convex 
(Blanchard (1983), West (1986)).
If it can be shown empirically that capital market imperfections are an im portant 
determinant of inventory investment, this would provide strong support for the 
theoretical argument that capital market frictions are essential to the understanding 
of aggregate fluctuations. There exists a body of reduced-form evidence to this effect. 
For example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find evidence that small manufacturing 
firms draw down their inventory stocks heavily following a monetary contraction, 
whereas large firms appear to borrow in order to smooth the impact of a downturn on 
their inventory behaviour. Similarly, using US panel data, Carpenter, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (1994) find that the inventory investment of small firms is more sensitive 
to cash flow than is the inventory investment of large firms. Of course, these studies 
are subject to the reservations discussed in the previous section of this chapter.
The excess variance of production puzzle is a robust and widely reported fact. It 
is highly likely that it is not caused by one of the competing theories exclusively. 
Therefore, a key goal of research in this area is to identify restrictions on the data 
which can discriminate between theories. The empirical prediction of the model of 
Chapter 3 which distinguishes it from other models of inventory investment is the 
following. A shock to the supply of the firm’s internal finance which is orthogonal 
to shocks affecting the firm’s desired level of inventories will, nevertheless, affect 
inventory investment. Thus, to test this model, one must first solve precisely the 
same identification problem as that discussed in the previous section.
18Existing m odels can be grouped into three categories: (i) modifications of the Linear-Quadratic 
model, (ii) stockout-avoidance models, and (iii) (S,s) models.
Chapter 2
R&D Intensity and Finance: Are 
Innovative Firms Financially  
Constrained?
2.1 Introduction
Arguably, the class of firms for which the assumption of perfect capital markets 
is least likely to be satisfied is the class of innovative firms - firms which devote 
resources towards the production of innovative products or processes. For this reason 
economists have long thought that a firm’s supply of internal finance will be one of 
the main determinants of its R&D expenditures. However, there is little empirical 
support for this belief. R&D expenditures are far less sensitive to fluctuations in 
internal finance than other expenditures, such as investment in physical capital. In 
their survey of the R&D literature, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) conclude that “the 
empirical evidence that either liquidity or profitability are conducive to innovative 
effort or output appears slim”.
These findings are consistent with the assumption of perfect capital markets, to­
gether with the hypothesis that different expenditures are driven by different factors. 
However, they are also consistent with the alternative hypothesis that financially
22
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constrained firms adjust different expenditures disproportionately in response to a 
common factor, namely changes in supply of internal finance. Innovative firms may 
choose to smooth R&D expenditures by using other expenditures as a buffer against 
fluctuations in internal finance, either because the costs of adjusting R&D are higher 
or because the elasticity of the marginal benefit to R&D is higher than that of other 
factors of production.
Simply by comparing the statistical properties of the R&D and investment processes, 
it is not possible to distinguish between these hypotheses. However, an implication 
of the perfect capital markets assumption is that each of the firm’s expenditures 
should be equally insensitive to fluctuations in the firm’s supply of internal finance. 
Therefore, a possible test is to compare individually the sensitivities to internal 
finance of different expenditures of innovative firms with those of non-innovative 
firms.
For the purpose of this study, an innovative firm is defined to be a firm with a 
research agenda to develop global innovations. While the assumptions underlying 
the theory on capital market imperfections may apply equally to firms which develop 
local innovations, much of this innovative activity may not be carried out within a 
formal R&D framework, and therefore would not be identified by the stratification 
criterion used in this chapter. The criterion uses the ratio of R&D to total investment 
as a measure of R&D intensity. Firms which reported an R&D intensity greater 
than their respective industry average in each year from 1990 to 1993 are classified 
as innovative.
The sensitivity of physical capital investment expenditures to fluctuations in internal 
finance is then compared across the two classes of firms . 1 For robustness, three 
different investment equations are estimated. Two of these are derived from the 
Adjustment Costs model of investment, Tobin’s q equation and the Euler equation
1In this sample the number of observations on R&D across tim e is insufficient to enable a 
similar analysis of the sensitivity of R&D to internal finance. A new accounting standard, SSAP  
13, requiring large firms to disclose their R&D expenditures in their company accounts, came into 
effect in the UK only in 1989.
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corresponding to the model, and the third is derived from an Accelerator model.
The results are consistent with the alternative hypothesis that innovative firms are 
financially constrained. Both the results from the q equation and from the Acceler­
ator model show that the sensitivity of investment expenditures to internal finance 
is much higher for innovative firms than for non-innovative firms. The Euler equa­
tion results show that the Adjustment Costs model is rejected for both sub-samples. 
However, there is evidence that the model does fit the data of non-innovative firms 
better than that of innovative firms. In particular, the investment expenditures of 
innovative firms are much more sensitive to measures of free cash flow (cash flow 
less tax and interest payments), than is the investment of non-innovative firms.
The test in this paper is not a direct test of whether or not financially constrained 
firms underinvest in R&D. However, viewed in conjunction with other empirical 
work, the results provide indirect evidence that this is true. The presence of financing 
constraints may reduce the returns to R&D by hindering the ability of innovative 
firms to establish a large market shaxe for a successful innovation before competitors 
introduce rival products. The responses to a survey of innovative firms in the US 
conducted by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) show sales and service 
efforts to be one of the most important means of appropriating the returns to R&D.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Theoretical issues regarding capital 
market imperfections and the determinants of R&D expenditures and physical cap­
ital investment are addressed in section 2.2. The empirical models and estimators 
are discussed in section 2.3. A description of the sample selection criteria and the 
results are given in section 2.4. The final section concludes.
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2.2 T heoretical Issues
2.2.1 Capital M arket Im perfections
One of the main assumptions upon which rest many of the results in the literature on 
capital market imperfections is the assumption of asymmetric information. When 
firms possess more information about the quality of an investment project than do 
potential investors, or when the firm can control variables which are not observable 
to the investor but which affect the return to the project, capital markets will be 
inefficient. Arguably, such conditions are most likely to be satisfied by firms which 
devote resources to innovating. The production of an innovation is more difficult 
to predict from observable inputs than is the production of most other types of 
output. Thus, there is greater scope for inputs which are not observable to all 
parties, such as a researcher’s skill level or the choice of research agenda, to affect 
the returns to an investment in the development of an innovation. Moreover, given 
that many innovations are produced in technologically advanced industries, there 
are potentially large differences in the information sets of the different parties to a 
financial contract. This will limit the extent to which monitoring can reduce possible 
agency problems.
Under the assumption that managers have an informational advantage over investors 
regarding the quality of the potential investment projects the firms may undertake, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that equity markets will be inefficient. Given its 
informational disadvantage, the market requires all firms to issue equity at a dis­
count. The discount can imply such a heavy dilution of the existing shareholders 
stake in the existing assets of the firm that it is not in their interest to undertake a 
positive NPV project. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that asymmetric information 
leads to similar outcomes in debt markets. Again the key assumption in this model 
is that the market is at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis the firm regarding 
the quality of the investment project for which debt finance is being sought (specif­
ically, projects differ according to the variance of their returns). Creditors react to
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excess demand by rationing some borrowers rather than by raising interest rates. 
Raising interest rates increases the riskiness of the average investment project in the 
pool of credit applicants because applicants with “safe” projects drop out. Again in 
equilibrium positive NPV projects will be forgone.
An inherent part of an R&D project is the accumulation of knowledge. Knowledge 
is a public good, and the existence of patent systems is typically justified as a mech­
anism whereby firms which invest in knowledge capital can protect their investment 
(in legal parlance, the firm’s intellectual property). However, patents work only im­
perfectly. In a survey of R&D investing firms in the US, Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, 
and W inter (1987) report that managers believed non-patent methods of protecting 
knowledge capital to be more important than patents. Those methods include the 
lead time a firm has over its rivals (i.e. differences in their knowledge capital), and 
the speed with which they accumulate knowledge. According to their study, inno­
vative firms clearly possess intellectual property which is unprotected by patents, 
and which has an important impact on the value of its investment projects. It is 
equally true that such property cannot be appropriated by another party; it is the 
inalienable property of the firm . 2
Hart and Moore (1994) have shown that, even in a model of debt with full infor­
mation, positive NPV projects may still be forgone. The results of this model rest 
upon two assumptions: first, that the entrepreneur possess an asset which a creditor 
is unable to appropriate, and second, that this “inalienable” asset affect the value 
of assets that can be appropriated (i.e the firm’s collateralisable assets). The threat 
that the entrepreneur may withdraw the inalienable asset from the production pro­
cess can limit the debt capacity of the firm below the cost of the investment project . 3  
Therefore, whether or not such an investment project is undertaken depends upon
2Strictly speaking, this type of intellectual property is the asset of the research staff within the 
firm. For simplicity, I assume that the researchers are also owner-managers of the firm.
3The strength of the threat to withdraw the inalienable asset depends upon the outside options 
available to the two parties. Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) report that one of the 
main channels of information spillover is through the hiring of rival firms R&D staff. This would 
indicate that the firm’s bargaining position vis-a-vis creditors is strong. Other things being equal, 
such a firm’s debt capacity would be low.
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the amount of internal finance available to the entrepreneur.
Even if innovative firms could mitigate the effect of capital market imperfections 
by, for example, revealing some of their knowledge capital to parties outside the 
firm, doing so may not be optimal. Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and W inter (1987) 
report that secrecy is also an important way firms protect their intellectual property, 
particularly for process innovations. Indeed, the importance of lead time over rivals 
suggests that revealing information may substantially reduce the value of the inno­
vation. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) and Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski 
(1985) present theoretical models in which it is not optimal for a firm to reveal all 
of its information, either through a third party such as a financial intermediary, or 
through patenting its innovations. Thus, innovative firms may prefer to use internal 
finance in order to protect their knowledge capital.
These theoretical arguments imply that internal funds will be an important source of 
finance for innovative firms. However, to what extent will firms be able to separately 
finance different investment projects? Firms which conduct R&D typically produce 
the product innovations and implement the process innovations which are the corre­
sponding outputs of the firm’s R&D input. Hence, the firm’s innovations will affect 
the returns to its physical capital, and the returns to investment in new physical 
capital will depend upon the firm’s future innovations. It is therefore unlikely that 
firms will be able to separately finance R&D projects and physical capital investment 
projects. If capital markets are imperfect for R&D projects, those imperfections will 
impact upon the firm’s physical investment projects due to the interdependence of 
the returns to the two types of investment.
2.2.2 D eterm inants of R&D and Investm ent
The above theoretical arguments suggest that fluctuations in internal finance should 
be highly correlated with at least some of the expenditures of innovative firms. The 
arguments do not imply that all expenditures will be sensitive to internal finance. 
Moreover, they do not place any testable restrictions on differences in the statistical
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properties of different expenditures. Therefore, one cannot test the hypothesis of 
imperfect capital markets by comparing the statistical properties of different expen­
ditures such as R&D and physical capital investment.
There is considerable empirical evidence showing that actual expenditures on R&D 
and physical capital respond to different, as well as to common, factors. For example, 
Lach and Schankerman (1989) show that while both R&D and investment respond 
to a shock which is permanent (in the sense that its impact is highly persistent), 
investment is influenced strongly by an idiosyncratic shock as well. 4
Such evidence is consistent with both hypotheses. In general, under the hypothesis 
that innovative firms are not financially constrained, desired expenditures on R&D 
and physical capital will respond to different, as well as common, factors. For 
example, physical capital may be subject to productivity shocks which do not affect 
the expected marginal value of knowledge capital. However, it is equally plausible 
that firms adjust only their physical capital expenditures in response to a shock 
to its internal finance. Under the alternative hypothesis that innovative firms are 
financially constrained, the responses of actual expenditures on R&D and physical 
capital to shocks to the firm’s internal finance will be proportionate only in the 
restricted case where the functions governing the firm’s production and its costs of 
adjusting inputs are homothetic. There does not seem to be much evidence that this 
restriction is valid. If innovative firms’ production functions were homothetic, the 
ratio of R&D to other inputs would be a constant function of firm size. However, as 
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) note, a stylised fact in the empirical literature is the 
“observation that the coefficient of [cross-sectional] variation of research intensity 
[R&D to sales ratio] is an order of magnitude larger than those of traditional inputs.”
Moreover, there are reasons why financially constrained firms would prefer to adjust
4Similar evidence has been reported by other authors. Pakes (1985) found that changes in 
R&D were associated with large changes in the market value of the firm, indicating the market 
expected a persistant change in profits. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found evidence that R&D  
expenditures were sensitive to permanent (i.e highly persistent) changes in cash flow, not transitory 
changes. They interpreted this as evidence of higher costs of adjustment for R&D, although it is 
also consistent with the above null hypothesis.
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physical capital investment. Given the importance firms place on secrecy and lead 
time over competitors, the implicit costs of laying off R&D staff may be much 
higher than the costs of adjusting physical investment. Researchers who are laid off 
may transmit valuable knowledge about firm’s research programs to its competitors. 
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) report that hiring a competitor’s R&D 
personnel is viewed by many firms as one of the most effective channels of information 
spillover. In addition to possessing knowledge valued by competitors, it is likely 
that researchers acquire a great deal of firm specific knowledge which would imply
i
substantial training costs associated with hiring new staff. A widely reported fact 
which is consistent with these observations is that within-firm variance of R&D 
is much lower than that of investment (see, for example, Lach and Schankerman
(1989), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Hall (1992)).
In conclusion, the observed stochastic properties of investment and R&D are consis­
tent with both hypotheses: (i) capital markets are perfect, but some of the determi­
nants of desired R&D and investment expenditures differ (as do the properties of the 
stochastic processes governing the respective determinants), and (ii) capital markets 
are imperfect, but actual R&D and investment expenditures respond differently to 
the common determinant of internal finance shocks. Therefore, an appropriate test 
to distinguish between them is to examine the sensitivity of the expenditures to 
changes in the firm’s supply of internal finance. In view of the lower within-firm 
variability of R&D, performing this test on investment will be more powerful.
2.3 Empirical Specification
2.3.1 M odel Specification
To distinguish between the alternative and null hypotheses, this chapter examines 
how different empirical models of investment fit the data of different sub-samples of 
firms. In common with much of the empirical investment literature, two of the em­
pirical equations used in this chapter are derived from the Adjustment Costs model
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of investment (expositions of this model are given in Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas 
(1967), and Gould (1968)): the q equation, and the Euler equation corresponding 
to the Adjustment Costs model.
The q equation is the first-order condition of the Adjustment Costs model under 
three assumptions: (i) linear homogeneity of the profit and cost of adjustment func­
tions, (ii) the firm is a price-taker in both input and output markets, and (iii), perfect 
capital markets . 5  Under the third assumption the market value of the firm equals its 
fundamental value (the expected present discounted value of future cash flows), while 
under the first two assumptions observable average q and unobservable marginal q 
are equal (see Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hayashi (1982)). The following quadratic 
form for the cost of adjustment function is assumed, G{I^K\e)  =  | ( ^  — a  — e)2K,  
where I  is investment, K  the existing stock of capital, a  a firm specific constant, 
and e a random variable. With this functional form, the first order condition can be 
written as,
,t  =  a * +  (2 -i)
where /? is the inverse of the marginal cost of adjustment, and Qn is the ratio of 
the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its existing assets.
Under the null, the theory predicts that Qa is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s 
investment rate. In practice, however, the error involved in measuring Q may be 
very large. Factor analytic empirical studies have shown that the factor common 
to the stock price and investment accounts for only a small percentage to the total 
variation in the stock price. The vast majority of price variation is accounted for 
by an idiosyncratic factor (see Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1990) and Lach and 
Schankerman (1989)). An advantage of estimating the Euler equation is that it can 
be done without using observations on the firm’s stock price.
5These functions are defined in the appendix, where both the first-order condition and the Euler 
equation are derived. Sufficient conditions for the linear homogeneity of the profit function are 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition in all input and output markets. An assump­
tion in this particular derivation of the model is that newly installed capital becomes productive 
immediately.
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To make the Euler equation estimable, either a functional form for the profit func­
tion can be assumed (as in Abel (1980)), or the linear homogeneity assumption 
made above can be maintained (as in Bond and Meghir (1994)). In fact, the linear 
homogeneity of the profit function can be relaxed to allow for imperfect competition 
in the output m arket . 6  With this linear homogeneity assumption, and using the 
same functional form for the costs of adjustment function, the Euler equation can 
be written as,
+ / ? 4  +  df +  vt, (2 -2 )
where I  represents investment, C F  cash flow, and Y  output. All variables are 
weighted by the firm’s capital stock,, K.- The term a,- picks up firm specific effects, 
while dt is a time dummy to control for fluctuations in the omitted price and user 
cost of capital terms (see appendix 2.A). One interpretation for the error term, vtl 
is that it is an expectational error (i.e it represents the effect of new information 
acquired in period t). As such vt should be i.i.d. However, Vt may also incorporate 
the effects of random variables such as the error term  in the costs of adjustment 
function, and therefore may not be i.i.d.
The theoretical model places the following restrictions on the signs of the coefficients 
in the above equation: (i) the coefficient on the lagged investment rate, /?i, is positive 
and greater than one; (ii) the coefficient on the square of the lagged investment rate, 
/?2 , is negative and greater that one in absolute value; (iii) the coefficient on cash 
flow, /?3, is negative, and (iv) the coefficient on output, /?4 , is positive if there is 
imperfect competition (otherwise it is zero).
A disadvantage of testing the structural equations from the Adjustment Costs model 
is that both equations are not well specified under the alternative. That is, if the 
restrictions implied by the model are rejected by the data it is not possible to
6Both the production function and the costs of adjustment functions are still assumed to be 
linear homogeneous, and input markets perfectly competitive.
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determine which assumption has been violated. It is possible that assumptions 
other than that of perfect capital markets have been violated. Therefore, as a 
check on the results of the regressions based on the Adjustment Costs model, a 
third and simpler model of investment is estimated: the Sales Accelerator model. 
A theoretical justification for this model can be derived under similar assumptions 
above, but without the assumption of adjustment costs (a good reference for this and 
other investment models is Nickell (1978)). Dropping that assumption eliminates 
the need to deal with expectations since the capital stock can be costlessly adjusted 
instantaneously. The factors driving investment are then the exogenous processes 
driving prices, the user cost of capital, and demand for the firm’s output. Moreover, 
with no adjustment costs and under the null, changes in output are driven entirely 
by exogenous shocks to demand. The empirical model can be written as,
(i)it = o“+dt+p (t "),,+» (2-3)
where again a t- picks up a firm specific effect, dt picks up fluctuations in prices and the 
user cost of capital, and the growth rate of sales, AY / Y ,  captures exogenous demand 
shocks. Under the null hypothesis, cash flow contains the same information as the 
growth rate of sales and therefore should not enter significantly. However, under the 
alternative hypothesis cash flow will enter significantly if financing constraints are 
binding.
2.3.2 Estim ators
An instrumental variables estimator is required for both of the empirical equations 
derived from the Adjustment Costs model. In the q equation, if et is realised at the 
beginning of the period (i.e. is in the firm’s information set in period £), then Qn will 
be endogenous through the effect et has on the actual amount of capital installed . 7  
Valid instruments for Qa will be variables with a lag or lead of j  or greater, where
7The error term, et , is interpreted as factors which are observable to the firm, but not to the 
econometrician. Alternatively, it can be assumed that ct~i  is in the firm’s information set and that 
e is serially correlated.
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j  is the lowest lag for which cov(et, t t- j)  =  0. The theory places no restrictions on 
serial correlation in the e process.
Similarly in the Euler equation, the standard within-groups estimator is biased due 
to the presence of the lagged dependent variable. Differencing the model to remove 
the fixed effect necessitates the use of instruments for the lagged dependent vari­
able terms. As in the estimation of the q equation, lagged values can be used as 
instruments. The validity of the instruments will depend on the degree of serial 
correlation in the error term.
Unlike the first two models, an instrumental variables estimator is not theoretically 
required for the Sales Accelerator equation, since sales growth in that model is 
assumed to be strictly exogenous. However in this equation, as in the previous two 
models, under the alternative hypothesis the cash flow terms may be endogenous. 
Therefore, as in the other regressions the cash flow terms are instrumented with their 
lags, and so can be interpreted as the effect of predictable cash flow on investment. 
Instrumenting cash flow in this way should eliminate any “informational” effect it 
may have on investment.
All of the above models are differenced to remove the firm-specific effect, a,-, and 
an Anderson-Hsiao estimator is used (Anderson and Hsiao (1982))(except for the 
basic Sales Accelerator model, which is estimated by OLS). While this estimator 
is not efficient, it is consistent. Monte Carlo experiments done by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) show that in dynamic models the loss of efficiency is not great if the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not too close to one (a condition 
which is satisfied in all of the estimated dynamic models).
The Anderson-Hsiao estimator differs from the efficient estimator in two ways. First, 
the GMM estimator which imposes the moment condition for each available instru­
ment in each time period is the efficient estimator in the class of instrumental variable 
estimators which use only linear combinations of instrumental variables (see Holtz- 
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)).8 In contrast, the
8For example, if there were five observations per firm, and instruments of lag two or greater
R&D Intensity and Finance 34
the moment conditions imposed by the Anderson-Hsiao estimator are the sum of the 
individual time period moment conditions corresponding to a particular lagged value 
of the instrument (i.e. there is one moment condition per instrument, as opposed 
to one moment condition for each year in which the instrument is available).
Second, the efficient GMM estimator uses an estimate of the optimal weighting 
matrix based on the residuals generated by an initial consistent estimator. The 
(arbitrarily chosen) weighting matrix for the Anderson-Hsiao estimator has two’s on 
the principal diagonal, and one’s on the main off-diagonals. 9  The standard errors of 
this estimator are White-corrected for heteroscedasticity.
The choice of the less efficient Anderson-Hsiao estimator was made for two reasons. 
First, the standard errors of the efficient GMM estimator produced by the estimation 
routine employed in this paper are biased downwards . 1 0  Second, in practice the 
large set of valid instruments typically available to the efficient estimator can raise 
difficulties. One of the problems encountered in this paper was the unreliability of 
test statistics, such as the Sargan statistic, when a large set of instruments were 
used.
One of the specification tests reported is the Sargan statistic (referred to as the 
J-statistic in Hansen (1982)). However, because the validity for the instruments 
depends crucially on serial correlation in the error term, two estimates of this serial 
correlation are also reported: a test for first-order serial correlation, the m l statistic, 
and a test for second-order serial correlation, the m2 statistic (see Arellano and Bond 
(1991)). If the error term in the undifferenced model is white noise, then the error 
term in the differenced model should exhibit first-order, but not second-order, serial
were valid, then this estimator would impose six moment conditions: there is one valid instrument 
for the observation in period 3 (lag 2), two for the observation in period 4 (lags 2 and 3), and three 
for the observation in period 5 (lags 2, 3 and 4). If the instrument set were restricted to only the 
second lag, there would be three moment conditions.
9If the models are exactly identified, then the orthogonality conditions are set exactly to zero 
and the weighting matrix is the identity matrix.
10Estimation was performed using the DPD routine developed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen 
Bond (Arellano and Bond (1988)). The bias in the standard errors of the two-step GMM estimator 
is reported in Arellano and Bond (1991).
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correlation.
2.4 D ata and R esults
2.4.1 Sam ple D esign
The empirical methodology is the same as that which is commonly used in the 
literature on financing constraints and investment. A sample of firms is first identi­
fied, and then stratified according to a particular criterion, which in this analysis is 
whether or not the firm is innovative. Conclusions are then based on a comparison 
of the results from the group of “controls” (non-innovative firms) with those from 
the group of “experimentals” (innovative firms). This methodology requires sam­
pling choices be made concerning the class of firms from which the initial sample is 
drawn, and the criteria used to stratify the sample.
For the purpose of this study, an innovative firm is defined to be a firm with a 
research agenda to develop global innovations. 1 1  While the assumptions underlying 
the theory on capital market imperfections may apply equally to firms which develop 
local innovations, much of this innovative activity may not be carried out within a 
formal R&D framework, and therefore would not be identified by a stratification 
criterion based on firm R&D expenditures. For this reason each firm, even those in 
the control group, was required to have at least one positive observation on R&D 
to be included in the sample. This is designed to reduce the number of firms which 
develop local innovations (and therefore may be financially constrained), but which 
either do not expense the costs under R&D in their accounts, or are not required to 
report their R&D expenditures . 1 2
11 Paul Stoneman offers the following distinction. “ Global innovation would be the first occur­
rence in an economy (or even wider in the world economy) of a particular event...Local innovation 
would be the the first occurrence of the event in the unit of observation.” Stoneman (1995), p .3.
12In January 1989 a new standard of accounting practice was introduced in the United King­
dom, the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP 13), which requires certain firms to 
report their R&D expenditures. SSAP 13 did not alter the conditions under which R&D may be 
capitalized rather than expensed. Few firms in the sample reported capitalized R&D expenditures.
R&D Intensity and Finance 36
By focusing on the aims of the firm’s research agenda, the definition of an innova­
tive firm includes firms which may not actually develop a global innovation. The 
successful development of an innovation may serve to mitigate the effect of capital 
markets imperfections. For example, in an hidden information context successful 
innovation may reveal the firm’s type. Consequently, constraints on the access to 
external capital may not differ between groups of firms identified as innovative and 
non-innovative according to a definition based on innovative output (patent counts 
or innovation counts) . 1 3
Accordingly, the stratification criterion appropriate for this study uses only infor­
mation on a firm’s inputs to the innovation process. The following measure of a 
firm’s R&D intensity is used: the ratio of R&D expenditures to total investment 
(physical investment plus R&D expenditures). Innovative firms were defined to be 
those firms whose R&D intensity was above its corresponding industry mean for 
each year in which the firm reported a positive R&D expenditure. Implicit in this 
stratification criterion is the assumption that firms attempting to develop global 
innovations must spend more on R&D than other firms within the same industry. 
Firms with a low R&D intensity are assumed to have research programs aimed at 
replicating the existing technology of competitors. Using this criterion, 42 of 144 
firms in the sample were identified as innovative. Table 2.1 shows the breakdown 
of observations for the entire sample, and for the two subsamples. Details of the 
sample selection procedures are given in the Data Appendix.
2.4.2 R esults
Tables 2 . 2  and 2.3 show the results for the Q regression (equation (2 .1 )) for innova­
tive and non-innovative firms respectively. Comparing the first column of the two 
tables we see that the point estimates of (3 are very similar for the two classes of 
firms. However, the test statistics for the class of non-innovative firms clearly reject
13Using data on actual innovations, Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1993) found that the 
probability of a firm producing an innovation in a period is greatly increased if the firm had 
innovated in previous periods.
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the instrument set. The Sargan statistic rejects at the 1 % level. The m2 statistic 
narrowly fails to reject at the 5% level. To deal with the potential serial correla­
tion, it is assumed that the error term in equation (2 .1 ) follows an AR(1 ) process, 
=  pU-\ +  */t, and a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation is performed. Using equation 
(2 .1 ) to solve for e gives,
.f =  (1 “  P )a i  +  PQ*t +  P ( j f )  .f j ”  P P Q it - i  +  vt- (2-4)
This specification is used in column 2 of Table 2.3. Although the m2 statistic now 
gives no indication of second order serial correlation, the Sargan statistic still rejects 
the validity of the instrument set. In column 3 the second lag is dropped from the 
instrument set, and in column 4 the fourth lag is dropped. The Sargan statistic fails 
to reject either of these two new instrument sets. However, the m l statistic fails 
to reject first-order serial correlation for the specification of column 3. Since the 
model is estimated in first-differences, this indicates misspecification. Therefore, 
the preferred specification for the class of non-innovative firms is that of column 
4. Although the common factor restriction on the coefficients in equation (2.4) is 
not tested, it seems likely that it would not be rejected since the product of the 
coefficients on Qt and ( I / K )t~i is 0.0039.
To test the null hypothesis against the alternative, free cash flow was included in 
these regressions. A comparison of column 2  in Table 2.2 with column 5 in Table 2.3 
shows that, while the null hypothesis can be rejected for both classes of firms, the 
effect of free cash flow on the investment of innovative firms is quantitatively larger 
(the coefficient on current free cash flow is 0.5712 for innovative firms as opposed to 
0.1502 for non-innovative firms). Lagging the free cash flow term does not change 
this result, nor does dropping the second lag of the regressor from the instrument 
set for innovative firms (columns 5 to 7 in Table 2.2). A Wald test on the joint 
significance of both free cash flow terms is highly significant for innovative firms 
(19.627 for the specification of column 4, and 13.131 for the specification of column 
7). For non-innovative firms the Wald test is 1.834, rejecting the joint significance 
of the cash flow terms at the 1 % level.
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These results are consistent with the hypothesis that innovative firms either have a 
preference for internal finance or face greater constraints on their access to external 
capital. The significance of cash flow for non-innovative firms indicates that the 
assumption of perfect capital markets may be inappropriate for this class of firms 
as well. However, it is possible that some innovative firms were included in the 
non-innovative group . 1 4
The results for the Euler equation regression, given in Table 2.4, are consistent with 
the Q equation results . 1 5  Looking at the first and fourth columns, it can be seen that 
the Adjustment Costs model does not fit the data well for either class of firm. None 
of the estimated coefficients are within two standard errors of the range predicted 
by the theory. Moreover, the coefficient on the cash flow term has the wrong sign. 
The Euler equation results show that the previous results are not due to the poor 
empirical performance of Q.
As with the Q equation results, there is some evidence that the model fits the data for 
non-innovative firms somewhat better than that for innovative firms. In the second 
and fifth columns, the second lag is removed from the set of instruments. Although 
the specification tests do not reject the validity of instruments dated t — 2 , dropping 
these instruments changes the point estimates of the two lagged endogenous variable 
terms for the non-innovative class . 1 6  The point estimates are now within the range 
predicted by the theory. Though less precisely estimated, both coefficients are still 
significant at the 5% level. By comparison, in column 5 the coefficients estimated 
from the data on innovative firms remain well outside the range predicted by the
14The estimated coefficients on the cash flow terms of non-innovative firms is very close to those 
reported by Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992) in their study of the Q equation 
using UK manufacturing firms.
15In their paper on firm investment, Bond and Meghir (1994) show that the firm’s debt policy 
can be incorporated into the Euler equation by including the term All the regressions
reported in Table 2.4 were run with this term included, but its coefficient was never statistically  
significant.
16If the error term were an MA(1) process, values of the regressors in period t — 2 would be 
invalid, but higher order lags would remain valid. Most of the bias arising from using the invalid 
t — 2 instruments is likely to be manifested in the coefficients on the lagged endogenous terms. 
However, the Hausman test statistic also fails to reject the validity of these instruments, taking a 
value of 3.118 with 2 degrees of freedom.
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theory.
It is not possible to deduce from this evidence which of the assumptions underlying 
the model is violated . 1 7  However, the most likely reason for the difference in the 
model’s fit to the data of the different classes of firms the greater impact of financing 
constraints on innovative firms. In columns 3 and 6 , the cash flow term  is replaced 
by free cash flow (the difference being interest payments and taxes). This has no 
effect on the coefficient estimates for non-innovative firms, but increases the value 
of the estimate of the cash flow coefficient of innovative firms. This indicates tha t 
revenue lost to taxes and interest payments affects the investment expenditures of 
these firms. Second, while it is plausible that other factors which could explain 
this difference, such as differences in the costs of adjusting physical capital, may be 
associated with R&D intensity, it is more likely that much of the variation in other 
factors is accounted for by variation in industry averages. Since the stratification 
rule compared a firm’s R&D intensity to its industry average, most industries are 
represented in both subsamples. To control for any residual inter-industry variation 
industry dummies were included in the estimation.
The results for the Accelerator Model, presented in Table 2.5, also support the 
hypothesis that innovative firms are financially constrained. Columns 1 and 4 show 
the results for the basic model, estimated using ordinary least squares. The sales 
growth term  is positive and significant in both regressions. The results with free 
cash flow included in the specification are in columns 2  and 5. 1 8  As with the Q 
model results, the effect of free cash flow on the investment of innovative firms is 
quantitatively much larger (0.676 as opposed to 0.2996). Although this is not a 
forward looking model, by instrumenting free cash flow any information about the
17Note that because the (Y /K ) controls for either imperfect competition or departures from a 
constant returns to scale production function, the only remaining assumptions are the assumed 
form of the cost of adjustment function, and perfect capital markets.
18Unlike the Q model, there is no theoretical argument that the sales growth term is endogenous. 
The free cash flow terms, however, may still be endogenous. Therefore, cash flow is instrumented 
with its lagged values in the subsequent regressions. The m2 statistic indicates that these instru­
m ents may not be valid for low intensity firms. A Cochrane-Orcutt transformation was performed. 
This eliminated the second order serial correlation. The point estimates of the coefficients on the 
free cash flow and sales growth terms were virtually identical.
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future marginal productivity of capital has been purged from the contemporaneous 
free cash flow terms. The results in columns 3 and 6  show that lagged free cash flow 
is also significant, although it has a negative sign for innovative firms. This confirms 
that the results in the Q equation regressions are not due to the poor empirical 
performance of the measured Q variable.
2.4.3 R obustness Checks
Reservations concerning the validity of the inferences made thus far arise from two 
potential problems in the sample design. The estimator used may be inconsistent due 
to endogenous sampling (selection bias). Alternatively, the results may be spurious 
due to inadequate control of other exogenous firm characteristics which affect the 
firm’s access to external capital.
There are two potential sources of selection bias: (i) survivorship in the panel, and 
(ii) the endogeneity of the sample stratification rule. The first source is due to 
the new accounting standard, SSAP 13. Prior to its introduction in 1989 no firm 
was obligated to report R&D expenditures. Consequently, firms which conducted 
R&D prior to 1990, but which did not survive until this time, are excluded from 
the sample. Moreover, SSAP 13 does not require all firms to report their R&D 
expenditures, though it applies to all the firms in this sample . 1 9
Unfortunately, simple tests of selection bias suffer heavily from a lack of power. 2 0  
However, it is not necessarily the case that non-randomness in the sample implies 
that conventional estimators are inconsistent. Inconsistency results only if the sam­
ple selection rule is dependent on the endogenous variables in the structural equa­
19The standard applies “in effect to companies which are public limited companies, or special 
category companies, or subsidiaries of such companies, or which exceed by a multiple of ten the 
criteria for defining a medium-sized company under the Companies Act 1985” .
20Verbeek and Nijman (1992b) suggest “quasi-hausman” tests comparing, for example, the es­
tim ates from a fixed effect estimator for the unbalanced panel and the balanced sub-panel. The 
term “quasi-hausman” , and the tests’ lack of power, stem from the fact that unlike Hausman tests 
both estimators are inconsistent under the alternative.
R&D Intensity and Finance 41
tions . 2 1  Unlike samples derived from survey data such as the income experiment 
data used for early studies of attrition bias (e.g. Hausman and Wise (1979)), there 
are few a priori reasons to believe this is true for this sample. Moreover, potentially 
biased estimates due to survivorship or attrition affects all studies which use panel 
data collected from publically available company accounts. Restricting analysis to 
balanced panels, as many studies have done, does not affect the consistency of the 
estimator.
Another possible source of selection bias is the potential endogeneity of the rule used 
to split the sample into high and low intensity classes of firms. Since the measure 
of R&D intensity was defined to be the ratio of R&D to R&D plus investment, 
this measure may not be independent of the endogenous variables in the structural 
equations (i.e. A ( I / K ) i t). However, the potential asymptotic bias for the fixed-effect 
estimator used in the analysis may not be very severe. Since the the stratification 
rule compared the R&D intensity in each year over the period 1990 to 1993 with the 
firm’s corresponding industry average over the same period, most of the variation in 
R&D intensity is between-firm . 2 2  Firm specific fixed effects explain approximately 
95% of the variance of R&D intensity . 2 3  The greater the proportion of R&D intensity 
explained by a firm-specific effect, the smaller will be the asymptotic bias of the 
fixed-effect estimator (see Verbeek and Nijman (1992b)). In the limit the fixed- 
effect estimator will be consistent.
Another reservation about the conclusions drawn is the degree to which they may be 
ascribed to factors other than innovativeness. One factor which has been commonly 
found to be associated with the presence of financing constraints is firm size. Table 
2.6 show the average firms sizes for the two groups at in 1987 and 1993 (over these
21 For a detailed discussion see Verbeek and Nijman (1992a).
22This will have removed much of the within-firm source of variation. However, because the 
period over which R&D intensity was averaged is so short (for some firms there was only 1 obser­
vation) not all of the within-firm source of variation will have been removed.
23This estim ate is from a simple one way error components model. All data on R&D intensity 
was used, even that for firms excluded from the sample. Other empirical studies have found similar 
results. For example, using a slightly different measure of R&D intensity, the R&D to sales ratio, 
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) found that over 95% of the structural variance in R&D intensity 
was accounted for by the variance of a firm-specific structural parameter.
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seven years the panel was at its maximum width). Looking at either the book value 
of the capital stock or total sales the average non-innovative firm is twice as large as 
the average innovative firm. Perhaps the difference in the results of the structural 
regressions is due to this size difference.
To check this the sample was stratified according to the initial observation of a firm’s 
capital stock. The 48 firms in the lowest third of the distribution were classified as 
small. The results of the Q equation regressions for small and large firms are given 
in Table 2.7. In contrast to many of the results in the investment literature, the 
coefficient on free cash flow is insignificant for small firms, but is strongly significant 
for large firms. Since the division of small and large firms is roughly proportionate 
across the innovative and non-innovative classes of firms (thirteen small firms are in 
the group of innovative firms) it is unlikely that those results may be attributed to 
the discrepancy in average size.
2.5 Conclusions
The assumption of perfect capital markets is least likely to be satisfied for the class 
of firms which devote resources towards the development of innovative products or 
processes. An implication of this assumption is that each of the firm’s expenditures 
should be insensitive to fluctuations in internal finance. To test this hypothesis ex­
isting empirical work either has examined the sensitivity of R&D expenditures to 
internal finance or has compared the properties of the statistical process of R&D 
with those of the processes of other expenditures such as physical capital invest­
ment. Neither of these procedures can distinguish between the two hypotheses: (i) 
that capital markets are perfect, and that different factors drive the firm’s different 
expenditures, and (ii) that capital markets are imperfect, and that the different ex­
penditures of the firm repond disproportionately to a common factor, namely shocks 
to the supply of internal finance.
To distinguish between these hypotheses, the sensitivity of physical investment
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expenditures to internal finance have been compared across innovative and non- 
innovative firms. For robustness, severed investment equations were estimated. The 
results from the Q model and the Accelerator model show that the sensitivity of the 
investment of innovative firms to internal finance is much higher than that of non- 
innovative firms. The Euler equation results show that, although the Adjustment 
Costs model is rejected for both classes of firms, it fits the data of non-innovative 
firms better than that of innovative firms. There is evidence that the difference in 
the fit across the different classes of firm is due to the impact of financing constraints 
on innovative firms.
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Table 2.1: N um ber of Observations in Sam ples 
Full Sam ple
No. of obs 7 8  9 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22
No. of companies 9 10 7 4 4  5 3 2 2 4 2 5 87
High Intensity Firm s
No. of obs 7 8  9 10 1 1  12 15 18 19 21 22
No. of companies 4 3 2 1 2 1  1 2 2 1  21
Low Intensity Firm s
No. of obs 7 8  9 10 1 1  12 13 15 16 18 21 22
No. of companies 5 7 5 3 2 4  3 1 2 2 4 6 6
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T able  2.2: Q E q u a tio n  - H igh  In te n s ity  F irm s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Qi 0.0161 0.0066 0.0093 0.0086 0.0076 0.0038 0.0032
(0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0044) (0.0054) (0.0107) (0.0077) (0.0079)
(.F C F / K ) t - 0.5712 - 0.1306 0.6174 - -0.2545
- (0.1506) - (0.4791) (0.1763) - (0.6389)
(.F C F / K - - 0.3707 0.2958 - 0.5684 0.7478
- - (0.0832) (0.2897) - (0.1385) (0.437)
m l -3.652 -3.53 -3.772 -3.296 -3.676 -3.815 -4.326
m 2 0.614 0.902 0.187 0.321 0.933 -0.171 -0.356
Sargan 2.773 1.664 2.894 2.471 1.543 0.656 0.269
prob (0.25) (0.797) (0.576) (0.481) (0.462) (0.72) (0.604)
1. The dependent variable is ( I / K ) t . Sample period is 1972-1993. There are 686 observations.
2. T im e and Industry dummies included in estimation. White-corrected standard errors are 
in brackets.
3. Lags 2,3, and 4 of the regressor are used in columns 1 to 4. Lags 3 and 4 in columns 5 to 7.
4. The m l and m2 test statistics are normally distributed around zero.
5. The Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the two cash flow terms in column 4 is 
19.627, and in column 7 is 13.131.
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T able 2.3: Q E q u a tio n  - Low In te n s ity  F irm s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Qt 0.0193 0 . 0 2 2 1 0.129 0.0223 0.0177 0.0171 0.0136
(0.0071) (0.008) (0.1446) (0.0077) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0107)
V / K h - i - 0 . 2 0 1 1 -0.2331 0.1751 0.1674 0.1717 0.1985
- (0.036) (0 .2 1 0 2 ) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0387) (0.0444)
Qt - 1 - -0.0092 -0.0746 -0.005 -0.004 -0.0054 -0.0159
- (0.0042) (0.0925) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0118)
(.F C F / K ) t - - - - 0.1502 - -1.2373
- - - - (0.0778) - (1.1255)
(F C F / K )t_! - - - - - 0.1061 0.9045
- - - - - (0.0486) (0.7542)
m l -6.393 -7.575 -1.165 -7.459 -7.281 -7.236 -1.807
m 2 -1.838 -0.589 -1.967 -0.777 -0.867 -0.812 0.9
Sargan 9.261 1 1 . 0 1 0.045 2.875 5.777 5.57 0.706
prob (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.831) (0.09) (0.123) (0.135) (0.703)
1. The dependent variable is (I / I<) t . Sample period is 1972-1993. There are 1894 observations.
2. Tim e and Industry dummies included in estimation. White-corrected standard errors are 
in brackets.
3. Lags 2,3, and 4 of the regressors are used in columns 1 and 2, lags 3 and 4 in columns 3, 
and lags 2 and 3 in columns 4 to 7.
4. The m l and m2 test statistics are normally distributed around zero.
5. The Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the two cash flow terms in column 7 is 
1.834.
R&D Intensity and Finance 47
Table 2.4: Euler Equation
Low Intensity High Intensity
( I / K ) t - 1 0.5554 1.2064 0.5864 0.0818 0.3659 0.1055
(0.134) (0.5387) (0.1386) (0 .2 1 1 2 ) (0.9165) (0.2182)
( I / K ) U -0.5192 -1.919 -0.5577 -0.0224 -0.0956 -0.0243
(0.2127) (0.9493) (0.2205) (0.2836) (1.3172) (0.2928)
(.C F / K 0.2198 0.3232 0.2195 0.2475 0.1839 0.3363
(0.056) (0.1084) (0.0726) (0.0714) (0.2155) (0.078)
( Y /K ) t - 1 -0.0067 -0.0165 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0105 0.0015 0.0199
(0.0055) (0.0098) (0.0048) (0.0114) (0.0151) (0.0078)
m l -7.443 -2.215 -7.604 -4.522 -1.726 -4.479
m 2 -0.749 -1.875 -0.826 1.259 0.699 1.177
Sargan 5.441 0.708 7.284 2.816 2.976 3.47
prob (0.71) (0.95) (0.506) (0.945) (0.562) (0.902)
1. The dependent variable is (I / K )t . Sample period is 1972-1993. There are 686 observations
for high intensity firms and 1894 observations for low intensity firms.
2. Tim e and Industry dummies included in estimation. White-corrected standard errors are 
in brackets.
3. Lags 2,3, and 4 of the regressors are used in columns 1,3,4 and 6. Lags 3 and 4 in columns 
2 and 5.
4. The m l and m2 test statistics are normally distributed around zero.
5. The Hausman test statistic for the validity of the lag 2 instruments is 3.118 (2) for low
intensity firms and 0.557 (2) for high intensity firms.
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Table 2.5: Sales A ccelerator M odel
Low Intensity High Intensity
(A Y / Y ) t 0.0608 0.037 0.0541 0.1245 0.0442 0.1381
(0.0264) (0.0251) (0.0258) (0.0408) (0.0448) (0.0415)
(F C F /K ) , - 0.2996 - - 0.676 -
- (0.0871) - - (0.154) -
(F C F / K - - 0.2116 - - -0.0706
- - (0.0598) - - (0.0224)
m l -6.267 -6.209 -6.219 -3.549 -3.614 -3.529
m 2 -1.859 -1.955 -1.793 0.634 0 . 8 8 0.663
Sargan - 3.035 4.137 - 0.018 1.029
prob - (0.219) (0.126) - (0.991) (0.598)
1. The dependent variable is (I / K )t . Sample period is 1972-1993. There are 686 observations 
for the high intensity firms and 1894 observations for the low intensity firms.
2. Tim e dummies included in estimation. White-corrected standard errors are in brackets.
3. Lags 2,3, and 4 of free cash flow are used in columns 2,3,5, and 6. OLS is used in columns 
1 and 4.
4. The m l and m2 test statistics are normally distributed around zero.
Table 2.6: Sum m ary Statistics
Innovative Firms Non-innovative Firms
Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Capital Stock 1987 99.2 22.8 284.9 93.6
Capital Stock 1993 238 73.9 566.7 189.5
Total Sales 1987 371.6 76.4 861.2 309.1
Total Sales 1993 689.7 158.7 1348.2 489.6
R&D Intensity 0.257 0.196 0.239 0.187
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Table 2.7: Q Equation - R obustness Check
Small Firms Large Firms
Q, 0.0177 0.0156 0.015 0.0358 0.0294 0.03
(0.0057) (0.005) (0.0046) (0.009) (0.0081) (0.0075)
( F C F / K ) t - 0 . 1 1 0 2 - - 0.3778 -
- (0.1054) - - (0.1186) -
(F C F / K - - 0.076 - - 0 . 2 2 2 1
- - (0.0727) - - (0.0688)
m l -4.441 -4.378 -4.481 -5.504 -5.387 -5.746
m 2 -0.456 -0.456 -0.466 -1.034 -0.965 -1.292
Sargan 0.124 0.079 0.153 1.718 3.565 4.24
prob 0.725 0.961 0.926 0.19 0.168 0 . 1 2
1. The dependent variable is (I / K ) t . Sample period is 1972-1993. There are 686 observations.
2. Tim e and Industry dummies included in estimation. White-corrected standard errors are 
in brackets.
3. Lags 2,3, and 4 of the regressor are used in columns 1 to 4. Lags 3 and 4 in columns 5 to 7.
4. The m l and m2 test statistics are normally distributed around zero.
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2.A  Adjustm ent Costs M odel
The firm’s problem is to maximise,
oo
v; =  n i+i, (2-5)
3=0
where (3 is a discount factor, assumed constant, and
11* =  PtF(Kt, Lt\fit) -  ptG(Iu K t\ et) -  wtLt -  p\. (2.6)
F(-, •; •) is the firm’s production function, G?(-, •; •) the cost of adjustment function, 
I  investment, K  the capital stock, L labour, p output price, p1 the price of new 
capital, w the wage, and p and e are random disturbances. The firm’s problem can 
be formulated as the following dynamic programming problem,
V(Kt- i i  Pt,€t) =  m ax{nt +  f iEt[V(Kt] pt+i, e*+i)]}, (2-7)
I,L
subject to (2 .6 ), the law of motion for capital,
K t+1 = ( 1  -  S)Kt +  Iu (2.8)
and the stochastic processes governing the two disturbance terms. Assuming that 
capital invested in period t also becomes productive in period t, the first-order 
condition for investment is,
( 5 ) . +( E ) / « ( £ L - *
and the Euler equation is,
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Using equation (2.10), the first-order condition can be re-written as,
This is the equation tested by the empirical q equation. To derive the latter from 
equation (2 .1 1 ), assume that both the production function and the costs of adjust­
ment function are linearly homogeneous in their arguments. This implies that the 
profit function 11(7, AT, L) is also homogeneous of degree one. Under this assumption 
it is straightforward to show that the value function is also homogeneous of degree 
one in K  (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989)). From Euler’s theorem it follows 
that the marginal value of capital, dV /dK ,  equals the average value of capital, V /K .  
Assuming efficient capital markets allows market prices to be used to construct the 
average value of capital. Finally, assuming the functional form for (?(•,•;•) gives 
equation (2 .1 ).
To derive the Euler equation used in the text, substitute equation (2.11) into equa­
tion (2 .1 0 ) to get,
Under the same linear homogeneity assumptions, the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive labour market and a monopolistic output market, and the assumed 
functional form for G(-, •; ■) equation (2 .2 ) in the text is derived.
2.B D ata Appendix
The data used is from the published accounts of UK listed firms and was collected 
from Datastream. From the sampling frame of firms covered by Datastream, a 
primary sample of firms was identified with the following criterion: the firms chosen 
for the sample were required to have at least one positive recorded R&D expenditure 
between the years 1990-1993. Very few firms reported R&D expenditures prior to 
the introduction of the new accounting standard, SSAP 13, in 1989. The initial
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sample consisted of approximately 340 firms, the vast majority of which had fewer 
than four positive observations on R&D .
Two further selection criteria were applied to this primary sample. First, all firms 
with fewer than seven consecutive positive observations on all of the main variables 
were deleted. Data on firms which have been acquired, or which have gone out of 
business, are not readily available from Datastream. Consequently, all firms have 
seven or more observations leading up to 1993 (the final observation for each firm 
is 1993). Second, firms with large one period changes in their capital stock were 
also deleted. This was done to exclude firms with major mergers or acquisitions. 
Firms whose change in their book value of lay outside three times the interquartile 
range above and below the median were removed. The final sample is an unbalanced 
panel consisting of 144 firms with observations ranging between seven and twenty- 
two. Approximately half of the sample had observations available for the full sample 
period (1972-1993).
In splitting the sample, Datastream’s finest industrial classification, level 6 ,was used.
The definitions of the data used in the construction of the variables is as follows 
(Datastream codes are in square brackets).
Tobin’s Q (Q): The market value of ordinary shares [HMV] plus the book value of 
total loan capital [321] less deferred tax [301] divided by the book value of capital 
[339].
Investment (I) : Total new fixed assets [435].
Cash Flow (CF) : Provision for depreciation of fixed assets [136], plus operating 
profit before tax, interest and preference dividends [137].
Free Cash Flow (FCF) : Cash Flow less total interest charges [153] and total tax 
charge [172].
Output (Y) : Total sales [104].
R&D : Research and Development (expensed) [119].
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Capital Stock (K) : Book value of net total fixed assets [339].
Market value of ordinary shares (V) : Historic market value of the firm [HMV].
Chapter 3
An Explanation of the Excess 
Variance of Production Puzzle
3.1 Introduction
A widely reported fact is .that the variance of production exceeds the variance of 
sales. 1 This contradicts the standard linear-quadratic model of inventory investment 
(e.g. Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (I960)), which predicts that in order to 
minimize costs firms will smooth production over time using inventories as a buffer 
against demand shocks. For this reason the fact is often referred to as the ‘excess 
variance of production puzzle’.
In this chapter , 2  we build a model of inventory investment and impose constraints on 
the firm’s access to external sources of finance. It is found that the presence of these 
financing constraints can explain the excess variance of production puzzle in a model 
which otherwise would not deliver this result. In addition, the model with financing 
constraints predicts that inventory investment and sales covary positively. Moreover,
^ h is  fact has been found using data of all levels of aggregation. For studies which report this 
finding in US data see Blinder and Maccini (1991), Blanchard (1983), and Blinder (1981). For 
UK data see Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1995). For evidence to the contrary see Fair (1989) and 
Krane and Braun (1991).
2This chapter is joint work with Urs Haegler.
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even though the stochastic process governing the demand for the firm’s output is 
specified to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the endogenous sales 
process exhibits positive serial correlation . 3  Both of these predictions are observed 
in data.
Evidence that financial factors influence inventory investment has been documented 
by a number of recent empirical studies. This paper provides a theoretical link 
between the evidence presented in these studies, and the fact that production varies 
more than sales. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find evidence that small manufacturing 
firms draw down their inventory stocks heavily following a monetary contraction, 
whereas large firms appear to borrow in order to smooth the impact of a downturn on 
their inventory behaviour. Using US panel data, Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen
(1994) find that the inventory investment of small firms is more sensitive to cash flow 
than is the inventory investment of large firms. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) 
include the ratio of bank loans to commercial paper in several structural models of 
inventory investment, and find that it has a significant effect. In an examination 
of the 1982 US recession, Kashyap and Stein (1994) find that the ratio of liquid to 
total assets has significant explanatory power for the inventory investment of firms 
without bond ratings, but not for those firms with bond ratings. Taking different 
structural models to UK panel data, Guarigla (1996) and Guariglia and Schiantarelli
(1995) find that financial factors have an important effect on the inventory behaviour 
of only those firms which may be in financial distress as indicated by a low coverage 
ratio (the ratio of cash flow to total interest expense). The latter study presents 
evidence that firms with high coverage ratios are more likely to smooth production.
From a macroeconomic perspective, inventories axe a crucial component of fluctua­
tions in aggregate output. For example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) report that 
while the stock of inventories makes up only 1% of US GNP, declines in the stock 
account for 50% of the drop in output in recessions. 4  Clearly any model of fluc­
3In models where there is the possibility that the firm may stock out in a given period sales 
and demand are generally not identical. Such models are referred to as stockout-avoidance models 
(e.g. Abel (1985), Kahn (1987)).
4Similarly, for the UK Sensier (1996) reports figures of 3% and 30%, respectively.
Financing Constraints and Inventories 56
tuations in aggregate output must be able to explain the behaviour of firm level 
inventory investment.
One of the shortcomings shared by many theoretical models of aggregate fluctuations 
is the weakness of their propagation mechanisms . 5  To strengthen this mechanism 
many recent papers have considered the effects of capital market imperfections . 6  In 
light of this development in the theoretical literature, it seems natural to ask the 
following question. Would imposing financing constraints on a partial equilibrium 
model of firm inventory investment explain the excess variance of production puzzle? 
This chapter provides an answer to that question.
Existing attem pts to explain the excess variance of production can be put into three 
classes: (i) the linear-quadratic model modified with the introduction of either non- 
convex costs or cost shocks (e.g. Blinder (1986), Eichenbaum (1989), Ramey (1991), 
Hall (1996), Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)), (ii) the stockout-avoidance model with 
a demand process that exhibits serial autocorrelation (e.g. Kahn (1987)), and (iii) 
models of the (s,S) type (e.g. Blinder (1981), Caplin (1985)). Although much of the 
empirical research has been directed towards the first class of models, satisfactory 
evidence in support of these models is scarce. For example, with the exception of 
Ramey (1991), most authors have estimated marginal costs to be upward sloping 
(e.g. Blanchard (1983), Eichenbaum (1989), West (1986)) suggesting that increasing 
returns are not a source of nonconvex costs . 7  Similarly, little evidence has been found 
that shocks to observable costs have a significant effect on inventory investment (e.g. 
Blinder and Maccini (1991), Miron and Zeldes (1988)).8
5This is particularly true of Real-Business-Cycle models. See Cogley and Nason (1995).
6See, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1995), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler (1992), 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
7Moreover, Bils and Kahn (1996) show that if marginal costs are decreasing, firm behaviour 
which minimizes quadratic costs produces the counterfactual prediction that the ratio o f inventories 
to sales is procyclical. More promising models which incorporate non-con vex costs while retaining 
increasing marginal costs have only been tested with data from the automobile industry (e.g. Hall 
(1996), Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)).
8However, Eichenbaum (1989) found no evidence against the version of the linear-quadratic 
model in which unobservable cost shocks are incorporated.
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In contrast, much less testing has been performed on models in the other two classes. 9  
However, the model developed here delivers testable predictions which distinguish 
it from all three categories above. In the second class of model, for instance, sales 
which do not contain information about expected future sales do not affect produc­
tion. This is not true in our model, since such sales change the amount of internal 
funds available to finance production. Similarly, the (s,S) model predicts that the 
covariance between inventory investment and sales is zero, whereas the model here 
predicts that this covariance should be positive.
The model is presented in the next section of the chapter. To illustrate the intuition 
behind our results, a small example and its solution is described in the third section. 
Then, in section 3.4, we discuss properties of the value and the policy function in 
the general model. Section 3.5 extends the results of the example to the general 
model, and discusses further predictions of the model. The final section concludes.
3.2 The M odel
Consider a firm which produces an (imperfectly) storable good at a constant unit 
cost (which we normalise to 1 without loss of generality). It attem pts to sell its 
output each period at price pt . We assume that pt — p > 1 Vt. The firm enters 
period t > 1  with a stock of goods Gt (those goods not sold in the previous period) 
and a stock of a liquid asset, Mf, which for convenience we will call money. The 
timeline of events in each period is shown in Figure 3.1.
At the beginning of each period, the stock of goods depreciates according to a 
depreciation technology represented by a nondecreasing and convex function S : 
—y 3R+, G <£(G). We impose £(0) =  0 and S(G) < G, i.e. the firm never loses 
all unsold goods through depreciation. Thus, after depreciation in period t the firm 
is left with Gt — S(Gt) > 0  goods. 1 0
9Kahn (1992) tests the stockout-avoidance model, and Mosser (1990) tests the (s,S) model.
10An equivalent assumption would be to require the firm to pay a pecuniary storage cost <y(G), 
financed by its money holdings. One then has to allow the firm to be able to ‘reverse-engineer’
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beginning end of
of period period
 1-------------------- 1----------------------- 1-------------------- 1------------------ 1------► time
depreciation decision realisation of ((*<+1 , M t+i)
on ytiSt,ct demand shock
F ig u re  3.1: T im in g  of E ven ts  in P e rio d  t
The firm then makes its gross production decision, yf, its savings decision, sti and
its consumption decision, c*, subject to the following financing constraints,
Ct > 0 (3.1)
St > 0 (3.2)
yt > 0 (3.3)
Ct +  St  +  yt < M t (3.4)
The non-negativity constraint on consumption can be interpreted as preventing the 
firm from raising equity capital from shareholders by issuing negative dividends . 1 1  
The non-negativity constraint on savings is simply a borrowing constraint. The 
non-negativity constraint on gross production implies that the firm cannot ‘reverse- 
engineer’ and thereby consume (or save) out of its beginning-of-period stock of 
goods. The final inequality is the budget constraint.
Once production has taken place the demand realisation, zt+1 , occurs. As usual in 
stockout-avoidance models we impose the following non-negativity constraint on the 
stock of goods (i.e. the firm is not allowed to short sell its output). Sales, x t , are 
given by
x t+1 = mm[zt+unt\, (3.5)
finished goods (generating one unit o f money per unit) in order to pay the storage cost in those 
periods when the stock of money is insufficient to cover them.
11 Alternatively, it could be interpreted as restricting the firm’s access to trade credit.
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where nt is the total amount of goods the firm makes available for sale,
nt = Gt -  8(Gt) + yt. (3.6)
The demand realisation zt+i is identically and independently distributed in each
period t on a subset Z  C IR+, according to the probability density function <j) : Z  —>
IR. The associated cumulative distribution function is denoted by $  : Z  -> [0,1]. 
For convenience we define z =  inf Z  >  0, and z =  sup Z.
The stock of money next period is the sum of savings in period s*, and the revenue 
generated from sales. Thus, the law of motion for the money stock is1 2
M t+1 = st + p x t+u (3.7)
The law of motion for the stock of goods is
Gt+i = Gt — 8(Gt) + yt — xt+i, (3-8)
which can be rewritten as Gt+\ = nt — x t+i.
The objective of the firm is to choose gross production and savings to maximise the 
present discounted value of consumption, i.e.
oo
max Eg Y .  (31 ct (3.9)
t=o
subject to (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7), (3.8), with the discount factor (3 E 
(0 , 1).
Since production is not directly observable in most firm data, it is defined empirically 
to be the change in inventories stocks plus sales . 1 3  Using the law of motion for the
12For simplicity we have implicitly assumed the gross interest rate on money to be equal to 1. 
The results are not affected by a gross interest rate R  different from unity, as long as P R  <  1.
13See, for example, the discussion in Blinder and Maccini (1991), p.77.
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stock of goods, (3.8), observable production, qt , is defined to be
qt =  Gt+i — Gt +  x t+i =  yt — &{Gt) (3.10)
Thus, observable production is gross production, y*, net of depreciation. Our pri­
mary interest is to compare the distribution of observable production qt with that 
of sales x t.
3.3 An Example
The main features of the general model can be illustrated with a simple example in 
which all variables are restricted to be integers. In any given period the number of 
goods demanded is either 0 , 1 , or 2 , with probabilities </>o, <^>i, and </>2 , respectively, 
such that <f>o +  <£1 +  <j>2 =  1. The firm can store only one unit of inventory between 
periods. If the firm has unsold inventories in excess of this storage capacity, they 
depreciate completely (i.e. the depreciation function is parameterised as $((2 ) =  
max{0 , G — 1 }).
We first postulate the following policy, and then demonstrate its optimality for a set 
of given parameter values. The firm provides two units of goods for sale whenever 
this is feasible, and one otherwise. If after setting n to 2 there is money left over, 
first unit is saved, i.e.. 5  =  1. If there are still remaining funds they are spent on 
consumption.
Table 3.1 summarizes this information. In a stationary equilibriumthe firm can 
assume eight possible states, (G, M ), which are listed in the first column. The 
second column is the (unique) sales realization, r ,  that has brought the firm into 
that state. Columns four to six list the policies we have postulated for each state. 
For each state an action is a triplet (n, 5 , c). For example, in state (1,3) the firm puts 
up two goods for sale, saves one unit of money, and uses one unit for consumption 
(the action is (2 ,1 ,1 )). Column three lists the net production decisions, <7 , implied 
by these actions. Column seven shows the flow utility enjoyed by the firm in that
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T able  3.1: T h e  P o s tu la te d  P olicy  an d  its  Im p lica tio n s
(G,M) X q n s c u x7 (G7,M 7)
0 ( 1 , 0 )
( 1 , 0 ) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (0 , 2 )
1 (0 , 2 )
0 ( 1 , 0 )
(2 , 0 ) 0 - 1 1 0 0 0 1 (0 , 2 )
1 (0 , 2 )
0 (2 , 0 )
(2 , 1 ) 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 ( 1 , 2 )
2 (0,4)
0 (2 , 0 )
(0 , 2 ) 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 ( 1 , 2 )
2 (0,4)
0 (2 , 1 )
(1,2) 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1 )
(1,3) 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1 )
(0,4) 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1 )
(0,5) 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
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state. Finally, the last two columns show the possible sales realizations, x ', and next 
period’s state, (G', M '), associated with each of the three realizations.
Our goal is to solve for the distributions of sales, x , and net production, q. To do so, 
we have to derive conditions under which the policy we have postulated is optimal. 
Then, we choose a parameter set T =  {p,/?,<£o, <£1 , ^ 2 } for which these conditions 
are satisfied. Finally, given this parameter vector one can solve for the stationary 
joint distribution of the state variables, and derive distributions for x  and q from 
there.
3.3.1 O ptim ality C onditions
To ensure that the financing constraint (3.1) will be binding, we first need to ensure 
that it is optimal to provide n = 2  in the first best case when there is no financing 
constraint. For this to be true, the chosen vector of parameter values must satisfy 
the following conditions:
+  >  P ~ \  (3-11)
</>2 -(<t>i + <tx>) < P~l - (3.12)
The first inequality ensures that it is optimal to provide two units for sale at the 
margin. The second ensures that it is never optimal to provide three units.
Summing across states, there are 40 feasible actions available to the firm . 1 4  We want 
to derive restrictions on the parameter values which are sufficient for the optimality 
of the actions we have chosen for the firm. For example, in state (1,2), under 
what conditions will the proposed action, (2 , 1 , 0 ), be preferred by the firm to the 
alternative action, (2 ,0 , 1 )? Since the proposed policy involves five different actions,
conditions such as this one must be derived for the remaining 35 feasible actions.
To express the firm’s preferences over actions in terms of parameter values, a nec-
14Due to the non-negativity restriction on gross production, y, the action (1,0,0) is the only 
feasible action for states (1,0) and (2,0).
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(0,4),(1,3) (2,1,1) >- (2,2,0) 1 - 0 ( 1 - < M > P M v3 - V 2 )
(1,2) (2,1,0) >- (1,2,0) 1 — /5(1 — 4>o) <  P 4 >o ( v 2 — vi)
(0,2),(2,1) (2,0,0) >-(1,1 ,0) &  >  <M«2 -
(0,2),(2,1) (2,0,0) >- (1,0,1) 1 < / 3 ( 1 - ^ o)(v3 - v2)
Table 3.2: Independent O ptim ality C onditions
essary first step is to express the difference in the value of two states in terms of 
the parameters. Several states have equivalent values. For example, compare u (l, 0) 
with v(2,0) in Table 3.1. In both states flow utility u =  0, and the expected dis­
counted value of next period is /3(<t>i +  </>2)u(0,2). Thus u(l,0) =  u(2,0), and we call 
the set {(1,0),  (2,0)} an equivalence class of states. For simplicity we refer to the 
value of this equivalence class as v\. Using the same reasoning we get another four 
equivalence classes
{(0,2), (2,1)},  {(1,2)},  {(1 ,3), (0 ,4)},  {(0,5)}.
We refer to the values of these equivalence classes as u2, U3 , u4, and u5, respectively. 
Note that V5  — u4  =  u4  — V3 =  1. In other words, the value function is linear over 
those states where consumption is positive.
In appendix 3.A, it is shown tha t the comparisons of different feasible actions imply 
only four independent conditions which must be satisfied by the parameter values 
in order for our proposed policy to be optimal. The four independent optimality 
conditions are summarised in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 should be read as follows. For example, in states (0,4) and (1,3) the action
(2 ,1 ,1 ) is preferred to the action (2 ,2 ,0 ) if the condition [ 1  — / ? ( 1  — <f>o)] > /?</>o(i>3 — v2) 
holds (i.e. consuming the marginal unit of money yields greater value than saving
Financing Constraints and Inventories 64
it). This condition is derived by simply comparing the values of each state under 
the alternative actions.
Thus, a chosen set of values for the parameters must satisfy the four conditions 
in Table 3.2 as well as conditions (3.11) and (3.12) in order for our proposed pol­
icy to be optimal. We assume that the set of parameters T takes on the values 
{p,/?, 0o, 0i, 02} =  {2,0.96,0.15,0.25,0.6}. These values satisfy the above condi­
tions.
3.3.2 Stationary D istributions
D efine/., 5  6 5  := {(1 ,0 ),(2 ,0 ),(2 ,1 ),(0 ,2 ),(1 ,2 ),(1 ,3 ),(0 ,4 ),(0 ,5 )} , £ aeS/ s =  1, 
as the probability with which the firm finds itself in state s at any point in time.
To obtain stationarity one has to ensure that, given the optimal policy, in each 
period the probability of leaving any state matches the probability of coming into 
it. In other words, the following system of equations has to be satisfied.
0 0 / 2 0  = ( 1  — 0 o ) 0 i o ,
0 o (0 O 2  +  /2 1  = 0 2 0 ,
0 o ( 0 1 2  +  / l 3  +  / o 4  +  / 05 )  = 0 2 1 ,
( 1  — 0 o ) (0 1 O  +  / 20)  = 0 0 2 ,
0 1  ( / 2 1  +  fo2 = 0 1 2 ,
0 1  (0 1 2  +  0 0 4  +  005  = ( 0 0  +  0 2 ) 0 1 3
0 2 ( 0 2 1  +  / 0 2 ) = 0 0 4 ,
0 2  (0 1 2  +  0 1 3  +  0 0 4 )  = ( 1  — 0 2 ) 0 0 5 -
Since these equations are not linearly independent, the system has to be ‘pinned 
down’ by the adding up constraint
£ / .  =  !•
ses
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flO  /20 /21 fo2  f l 2  /l3  /04 fo5
0.0039 0.0219 0.1242 0.0219 0.0365 0.2070 0.0877 0.4969
Table 3.3: Stationary D istribution  of the States
y 1  y =  0  y =  1  y = 2
0.0219 0.1281 0.2436 0.6064
£ =  0  x = 1 x = 2
0.1500 0.2655 0.5845
Table 3.4: D istributions of N et Production  and Sales
The solution to the system is given by
/ 2 0  —  
f i o  =  






2 — 00 1 ~  00








/ 2 0 ,
01
01 (1 — 00)
02




The values chosen for the set of parameters T gives us the stationary joint dis­
tribution for the state variables shown in Table 3.3. From this distribution, the 
distributions for (net) production and sales can be derived. There are shown in 
Table 3.4.
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The mean of production and sales is q =  x =  1.4345, and the variances are var(q) =
0.6334 > 0.5447 =  var(x). Thus, in this example the firm exhibits production 
counter-smoothing.
3.3.3 Financing Constraints and the Excess Variance o f Production
It is the presence of the financing constraints in this model which delivers the excess 
variance of production result. If capital markets were perfect, then the firm’s optimal 
policy for production would be such that var(q) = var(x).  Each period the firm 
would simply replace what had be sold and what had depreciated. This implies that 
net production, q, is set equal to sales, x, in each period, which, in turn, implies 
that the number of goods put up for sale each period is constant.
When the firm is financially constrained such a policy is not possible. After par­
ticularly low sales realizations depreciation is so high that the firm does not have 
sufficient funds available to replace what had been sold and what had depreciated. 
In these circumstances net production, q, will be less than sales, x, and the amount 
of goods put up for sale next period drops below the unconstrained amount. We 
say that in this case the firm ‘underproduces’. Now suppose that after a low sale 
the firm experiences a relatively high sale. In this case, it will have more than a 
sufficient amount of cash to replace all that had been sold and depreciated. It will 
now be in a position to rebuild its inventory back up to its unconstrained level, or 
at least close to it. Under these circumstances, the firm will ‘overproduce’. What 
drives the variance of the firm’s production above that of sales is the association of 
underproduction with low sales realizations, and overproduction with medium sales 
realizations.
Table 3.1 reveals that there is a discrepancy between x  and q only for states (2,0) 
and (0,2). In (2,0), where the sales realization (x = 0) is associated with production 
(y =  —1), underproduction of one unit occurs. In this state the firm would like to 
make two units available for sale, but is prevented from doing so by the financing 
constraint. This, in turn, causes the firm to overproduce by one unit in state (0,2).
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Figure 3.2 helps to illustrate the intuition behind this result. In effect, the financing 
constraints cause a low sales realization to be mapped into an even lower production 
realization, and a medium sales realization to be mapped into a high production 
realization. If we compare this to the distribution of sales and net production when 
the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is absent, as depicted in Figure 3.3, 
we see this effect clearly.
3.3.4 The N ature of Financing Constraints
To what extent do the results in this paper depend on the type of financing con­
straints used? Here we offer only informal arguments that our results will not alter 
under different assumptions about the financing constraints. The basis for this is 
that regardless of their nature, financing constraints will be binding primarily after 
low sales realizations. Thus, underproduction will still be associated only with low 
sales realizations, which is the central feature of the excess variance of production 
result.
More specifically, consider two different ways to model the financing constraints. For 
one possibility, we may assume that there is a perfectly elastic supply of external 
finance, but that it is more costly than internal finance. For the other alternative, 
we may think of the firm being able to enter information-constrained insurance 
contracts.
The first case, where the firm faces a hierarchy of finance, is closer to our model. In 
fact, the financing constraints in our model could be interpreted as representing a 
finance hierarchy in which the premium on external funds is so high that it is never 
optimal for the firm to use external finance. Suppose instead that the premium 
were low enough to make the use of external finance attractive in some situations. 
In this case the firm can find itself in three qualitatively different regions. In the first 
region, internal funds will be so low that the benefit of the marginal good put up 
for sale is high enough to warrant the use of external finance. In the second region 
the firm is still constrained, but the value of the marginal good put up for sale is
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frequency
f l 2  +  / l 3
f i o  +  /21
sales
f l 2 +  /13
f i o  +  y*2:
— 1  0  1  2  net production
F ig u re  3.2: D is tr ib u tio n s  w ith  F inancing  C o n s tra in t
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freq uency
/ 2 0  
f i o  +  / 2 1
/04 +  /05
f l 2  +  / l3
/ 2 0  
f i o  +  / 2 1
sales
fo4 +  /05
f l 2  +  f l 3
1 0 1 2 n et p rod u ction
F ig u r e  3 .3 :  D i s t r ib u t i o n s  w i t h o u t  F in a n c in g  C o n s t r a in t
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not high enough to justify the use of external funds. Here the firm behaves exactly 
as it would in our model. In the third region the firm is unconstrained. Note that, 
because external finance is more costly, the optimal amount of goods put up for sale 
will be lower when the marginal unit is financed externally than when the marginal 
unit is financed with internal funds. Thus, if the firm begins with the unconstrained 
amount of goods for sale and has a low sales realization it will underproduce. In 
other words, underproduction will still be associated with low sales realizations.
For the second case, which is somewhat further from our model, our argument is only 
suggestive. Suppose that lenders can observe inventories at only two points in time: 
after sales and depreciation, and just before sales. In other words, lenders can ob­
serve the firm’s gross production decision, yt . However, lenders cannot observe sales 
and depreciation . 1 5  In this setup there is an incentive for the firm to report a bad 
sales realization when in fact there had been a good sales realization. Typically, the 
optimal contract in such a setup would place restrictions on the observable decision 
variable in order to ensure that the borrower truthfully reports good outcomes. This 
usually implies that in bad outcomes the level of the decision variable is lower than 
it would be if all variables were observable, in order to introduce a cost to reporting 
a good outcome as a bad outcome. We know that if all variables are observable, then 
the optimal policy of the firm is to set gross production such that it equals the sale 
plus depreciation. In the information-constrained framework, an optimal constract 
would force the firm to set gross production lower than this for low sales realiza­
tions. Thus, this informal argument suggests that the association of low sales with 
underproduction would remain, and that the excess-variauce-of-production result is 
preserved.
15This argument is consistent with depreciation taking the form of a fixed storage capacity as 
in the example.
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3.4 The General M odel
We can specify either gross production, yt, or, equivalently, the amount of goods 
made available for sale, nt , as a choice variable since nt = Gt — S{Gt) + yt. Therefore, 
taking nt and st as the choice variables, the Bellman equation for the problem 
outlined in section 3.2 is
v(Gu Mt) =  max \  Mt -  st -  (nt -  Gt + 6(Gt)) + (3 [  v(Gt+i, Mt+i) </>{dzt+i)nt,st I Jz_
+  /? £ v ( 0 ,M m )# (fc <+I)} (3.13)
subject to (3.1), (3.2), (3.3),(3.7), and (3.8).
3.4.1 The U nconstrained Problem
Consider removing the non-negativity constraint on consumption (3.1) from the 
problem above . 1 6  In this case, the following policy would be optimal. Optimal 
savings would be to set s*(G,M)  =  0 in each period since (3R < 1. The optimal 
choice of n t will always be an interior solution, so we can differentiate the Bellman 
equation with respect to nt. Assuming that S is differentiable (denoting with S' its 
first derivative) and using the envelope conditions, VMt =  1 and vot =  (1 — £'((7*)), 
we obtain
r n t roo
/  (1 — fi'{Gt+i)) 4>(dzt+i) +  /  p<j>(dzt+i) = P (3-14)
J  z_ J n t
as the Euler equation. Since equation (3.14) involves neither Mt nor Gt the optimal 
policy for the firm is to set n*(G, M)  =  AT, a constant. This implies that in each
16We refer to this problem as the unconstrained problem, and to the non-negativity constraint
on consumption as the financing constraint. Relaxing the latter allows the firm to perfectly insure
its desired production expenditure against negative demand shocks through negative consumption 
in those periods where it does not have sufficient cash on hand. It is precisely the availability of 
this insurance we wish to remove with the constraint on consumption. If, instead, we had relaxed 
the non-negativity constraint on savings (3.2), the firm’s optimal policy would have been simply 
to borrow as much as possible in the first period, due to the linear utility function and P R  <  1.
Financing Constraints and Inventories 72
period net production, qt, is set equal to sales, x t. Therefore, if this financing 
constraint, is relaxed var(q) = var(x).
3.4.2 T h e  C o n s tra in ed  P ro b lem
When the non-negativity constraint on consumption is imposed we can no longer 
guarantee the differentiability of the value function since there is no way to guarantee 
that the optimal policies will be interior solutions. Thus we cannot simply analyse a 
version of equation (3.14). However, the following properties of the solution can be 
established, and they are sufficient to prove that the variance of production exceeds 
the variance of sales when all of the financing constraints are imposed.
P ro p o s itio n  3.4.1 The Bellman operator defined in (3.13) is a contraction map­
ping with a unique fixed point. The fixed point, v, satisfies the following properties:
1. v is increasing in M  and G.
2 . v is concave.
3. v is strictly concave in the region of constrained states.
The proof of the proposition and the first two properties are fairly strightforward, 
and therefore are given in appendix 3.B. To show the strict concavity of v in the 
constrained region, we adopt the method of a concavity proof in Abel (1985).17 
Imagine there are three firms, firm A which puts up for sale, firm B which put 
up and firm C, which puts up an a +  (1 — a)nB- The third firm always gets 
a  of firm A’s demand z f ,  and ( 1  — a) of firm B’s demand z f . If neither firm A 
nor firm B stocks out, then the value of firm C will equal av(nA) +  (1 — a )v (n s ). 
The same will be true if both A and B stock out. However, suppose firm A stocks 
out but firm B does not. In this circumstance, firm C will be able to meet the
17In that paper production occurs with a lag. Consequently, only the stock of inventories which 
the firm has at the beginning of the period are available for sale. Moreover, the stock o f inventories 
is the only state variable.
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excess demand of firm A, a ( z f  — n^), by selling i t ’s unsold inventories from firm B’s 
demand, (1 — ol)(tib — z f ) .  Therefore, v(anA +  (1 — c*)71#) >  av(nA) +  (1 — ot)v(ns)-
To adapt this proof to our model we have to incorporate optimal policies into the 
argument. Consider two states in which the firm is constrained, (Go, M q)  and 
(G i,M i) where G\ — £(Gi) +  M\ > Go — <S(Go) +  Mq. A set of optimal policies 
is associated with each state. Choose one policy from each set. Let (no,So) be 
the chosen policy from the set associated with (Go, Mo), and (rci,si) be the cho­
sen policy for (G i,M i). Since the firm is constrained in both states, it cannot 
be the case that the chosen optimal policies are identical. Consider a third state, 
(G0 , Mq) =  ((1 — 9)Gq  +  0 G i,(l — 9)M q  +  9M\). Assume that the policy the firm 
follows in this state is (no, s#) = ((1 — 9)uq + 0ni, (1 — 9)so + 9 s \ ) .  Call vq the value 
attained by this policy in the state (Go, Mo).
Suppose that in state (G#, Mo) the firm receives (1 — 9) of the demand shock z0 for
state (Go, Mq), and 9 of the demand shock z\ for state (Gi, M i). If the firm stocks 
out in neither state (Go, Mq)  nor (Gi, M i), or if it stocks out in both of these states, 
then
Go — (1 — 9)(n0 — xo) +  9{n\ — a?i) =  (1 — 0)Go +  9G\
M e =  (1 -  0)(so + p z 0) +  9{si +px{)  =  (1 -  0)MO -1- 0 M i,
which implies that in these circumstances
ve{Go, Mo) = (1 -  9)v(G0, M) +  9v{Gu M x) .
As in Abel’s argument, however, if the firm stocks out in only one state then
Go >  (1 — 9)Gq +  0G i 
Mo >  (1 — 9)Mq -f- 9M i ,
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because the firm can use unsold goods from one state to meet the excess demand of 
the other state. For these outcomes,
vq{ G q, Mg)  >  (1 — 0)u(Go,  Mo)  +  6 v { G \ , M i ) .
Since the policy (ne,s^) is not necessarily optimal it is true that v(Gg,Mg) >  
vg(Gg, Mg). Therefore, the value function is strictly concave in the region of the 
state space where the firm is constrained. □
In the example of section (3.3) we were able to compute a stationary distribution of 
states. Showing that an ergodic distribution exists in our general setting is a rather 
formidable task. We therefore simply assume existence of stationarity in the general 
model.
The following propositions and corollaries characterise the optimal policy functions, 
and are used to derive a number of statements about the distribution of sales and 
net production in the next section.
P ro p o s itio n  3.4.2 There exist upper bounds to the optimal policies, n and s, re­
ferred to as n, s. I f  M  — s > f i  — G + $(G) the remaining money is used for into 
consumption.
Proof. Suppose the firm never consumes. Since v(G , M)  is then strictly concave 
in both its arguments, the marginal return to savings and to production will be 
decreasing in both state variables. The value of an infinitesimal unit of money 
would tend to /? as M  —> oo, since the probability of encountering a sequence of 
sales realisations in which the non-negativity constraint on consumption will be 
binding tends to zero (effectively, the firm becomes unconstrained). Since j3 < 1 , 
there will be a level of savings, s, beyond which the firm will prefer consumption 
to further savings. Similarly, as G -> oo the marginal value of inventories tends to 
a value below one, since the probability of selling the marginal unit goes to zero. 
Thus, there also exists a level of goods the firm puts up for sale, n, beyond which
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the firm prefers consumption to further production.18 □
Corollary 3.4.3 There exist optimal policy functions, s*(G,M) andn*(G, M), which 
map each element of the state space into the space of feasible actions.
Proof: The one-period return function is concave in the state variables, and the 
feasibility set for the choice variables is convex. Over the region where consumption 
is zero v is strictly concave. It follows that the maximum in (3.13) in this region 
is attained by unique choices of st and nt . From Proposition 3.4.2, it follows that 
when consumption is positive, s* = s and n* =  n. □
Corollary 3.4 .4  The mean of production, q, equals the mean of sales, x.
Proof. Assume q > x  is true. Then the firm would accumulate inventories indefi­
nitely, contradicting the existence of n. Conversely, if q < x were true, then G —> 0 
as t —> oo, which cannot be optimal since v(G, M)  is increasing in G. From an 
intuitive viewpoint, this corollary holds because each unit of output that the firm 
produces is either sold, or depreciates which is accounted for as negative production. 
□
For the purposes of the next Proposition, define the total funds available to the firm 
in period t to be Gt — S(Gt) +  Mt.
Proposition  3.4.5 The optimal policy functions n*(G,M) and s*(G,M) are non­
decreasing in the total funds available to the firm.
Proof: We will first present the proof for n*(G, M).  The statement holds when 
the non-negativity constraint on consumption is not binding, since in those states 
additional money holdings are simply used for consumption, without changing the 
amount h made available for sale. For states in which the non-negativity constraint
18The existence of s  and h implies the existence of endogenous upper bounds to the state space, 
M  and G.
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on consumption is binding, we prove the statement by contradiction. Note that in 
those states the return function is equal to zero, and we can therefore write
t-n* (G,M)
u(G, M) =  0  I v(n*(G,M)  — z,s*(Gi M)  +  pz)4>(z)dz
+P[ 1 -  $(n*(G, M))]v(0 ,s*(G, M)  +  pn*(G, M)). (3.15)
Assume that in some (G, M)  the optimal policy is to choose values (n ,s). Also 
suppose that, given some small e > 0, the optimal policy in (G, M  +  e) is (n — /z, s +  
e -f fi), for some small p > 0, which implies
r n - n
/ v(n — fj, — z , s  -f £ + fi + pz)(l>(z)dz +  [1 — $ (n  — fi)]v(0 , s  -f £ — ( p — l)fJ> +pn) > Jz_
J  v(n — z, s 4- e +  pz)(f>(z)dz +  [1 — $(n)]v(0, s +  e +  pn). (3.16)
But then the firm could do better by shifting funds fi from production to savings in 
(G, M)  as well, i.e.
/n-n v(n — fi  — z , s  +  fi  +  pz)4>(z)dz +  [1 — $ (n  — a O M O , s  +  (p — 1 ) f i  +  pn) >
J  v(n — z, s +  pz)4>(z)dz +  [1 — $(ra)]i;(0, s +  pn). (3-17)
Hence, ( 72, 3 )  cannot be an optimal choice in state (G, M), which contradicts the 
initial assumption. Inequality (3.17) is proven in appendix 3.C.
As for the function s*(G, M ), assume that there is a range of states over which the 
function is decreasing. The only way s* could be decreasing in the constrained region 
is if there was an overproportionate increase of n in response to a small increase of 
funds available (be it in the form of more money or of higher goods inventories). 
Due to strict concavity of the value function, however, the negative effect on the 
expected value of v next period due to a decrease in s would more than offset the 
positive effect of an increase in n. We conclude that such a policy cannot be optimal. 
□
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C o ro lla ry  3.4.6 Each state (G , M) has a unique sales realisation which moves the 
f irm from other states into this state. In other words, there exists a function, call it 
x*(G, M) : (G , M)  >->■ x  which maps each element of the state space into the set of 
feasible sales realisations.
Proof. Suppose that the sale x' moves the firm to the state (G , M )  from the post­
production pair (n', s'), and that a different sale x" moves the firm to the same state
(G, M)  from a different post-production pair (n " ,s" ). Then
G = n' — x' = n" — x" => x" -  x' = n” -  n’
M  = s' + px’ = s" + px" => x " - x ' = — -
V
However, from Proposition 3.4.5 we know that if n" > n' then s" > s'. Thus the 
above equations cannot be satisfied simultaneously when x ' 7  ^ x". □
3.5 Variance Results
We are now in a position to extend the results of the example concerning the relative 
variances of production and sales to the general model. In addition, we demonstrate 
that the sales process will be positively serially correlated.
P ro p o s itio n  3.5.1 The variance of production exceeds the variance of sales. The 
covariance of production and sales also exceeds the variance of sales.
Define Qs := { (£ , M)  | x*(G, M)  =  x}. Define the expected difference between 
production and sales, given x*(G, M ) =  x, to be
h(x) = f (q(e) — x) /(e )  d e ,
JQi
where /(e )  is the stationary density of the state e =  (G, M).
(3.18)
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Using this definition of h(x), and letting X  =  [i,n], we can write var(q) as
var(q) =  J  (h(x) + x — p )2 dx
=  J  (x2 +  fi2 — 2px) dx +  J  h(x )2 dx — 2p J  h(x)dx  + 2 j  h ( x ) x d x  
'(x) +  J  h(x )2 dx + 2 J  h (x )x d x=  van
We can write out a similar expression for cov(x, g).
cov (x,q) = j  (h(x) + x)(x — fj,2) dx 
J JC
= J  h(x) x d x  — fi J  h(x) dx + J  x 2 dx — fi j  x d x
=  f  h(x) x dx +  var(x)
J  X
From these expressions it can be seen that sufficient condition for var(q) > var(x), 
and a necessary and sufficient for cov(x, q) > var(x)  is
J  h ( x ) x d x >  0 . (3.19)
From Proposition 3.4.2, there is an upper bound to sales which lead the firm to 
produce less than it has sold. Define the function a(n) to be the lowest sale x  for 
which the firm will set its net production q =  x, given that it had provided n goods 
for sale. Suppose in period t — 1  the firm is unconstrained, and therefore puts up n 
goods for sale. Then a(n) is the lowest sale for which the firm will put up n for sale 
in period t. That is, a(n) will be the sale which satisfies the following equation,
pxt = nt - G t + 8(Gt) .
Substituting for Gt we can rewrite the above equation as
(p -  l)x t =  8(nt -  x t) . (3.20)
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8(N  -  x)
Sales
F ig u r e  3 .4 :  E x i s t e n c e  o f  a
Thus a(h) — 8(h — a(n)) /(p— 1 ). The sale a(h) generates just the amount of revenue 
required to get the firm back to fi. To see that a(n) € (z , n) look at Figure 3.4, which 
is the graph of equation (3.20). Since p >  1 , a(n) is always strictly in this interval. 
Moreover, for n < fi, the function 8(n — a(n)) shifts towards the origin, thereby 
reducing a(n) for smaller n. Thus, if the firm provides less than n for sale, and sells 
more than a(n) it will either increase the amount it puts up for sale next period 
(i.e. over-produce), or increase its savings, or both (it may also start to consume if 
(n ,s) is an interior point in its new feasibility set). If the firm has provided n for 
sale, and sells more than a(n), the firm will again provide n, and will add to either 
savings or consumption (or both).
Therefore, under-production will occur only in the interval [z7 a), whereas over­
production will occur in the interval (z, n). Thus, h(x)  can assume negative values 
only in the interval [z7 a). Over the interval [a(n),n), h(x) > 0. Moreover, since the 
firm never wants to provide more that n for sale, it will never overproduce after it 
sells n. Therefore, h(n) =  0. Finally, we know from corollary 3.4.4 that the means
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of production and sales are equal. Therefore, it is true that
f h{x)dx = 0 . (3.21)
J  X
Rewriting equation (3.21) gives us
•a(n)ra\n) rn
/  h(x) d x +  h(x) dx =  0  
Jz Ja(n)i (
From the properties of h(x), it is true that
*a(n)J  h(x)xdx  + J  h ( x ) x d x >  0 ,
L(n)
which is what we desire to prove. □
C oro lla ry  3.5.2 Changes in the stock of inventory put up for sale, A n i} covary 
positively with sales, x t .
Proof Writing out the expression for cov(Ant, x t) we get
cov(Ant ix t) =  cov(nt, x t) — cov(nt- i , x t)
= cov(qt +  Gt,Xt) — cov(nt- i , x t)
= cov(qt , x t) -f cov(nt- i  — x t , x t) — cov(nt-  1, x t)
= cov(qtj x t) — var(xt) ,
which is positive from the above Proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  5.2: Sales exhibit positive first-order autocorrelation.
P roof: Let x t =  x  and take Q(x) to be defined as above. For each q(G, M)  such 
that (G , M)  € Q{&), the set of feasible sales next period is the interval [z , n(G , M)\. 
Define the probability that Xt+i =  x' conditional on the firm providing n(G , M)
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goods for sale to be
An(x') =  <
if x ' < n(Gy M)  
1 — 4>(n) if x' =  n(G, M)
0 if x' > n(G, M)
Thus we can write the expected difference of next period’s sale from the uncondi­
tional mean, /i, conditional on this period’s sale x t = x  as
m(x)  =  f f (x' — fi) An(x') /(e )  de dx1, 
JQ(x) Jz
where again /(e )  is the stationary density of the state e =  (G, M).  The covariance 
of sales with its first lag is then
cov [x i x) =  f  m(x)(x  — fi)dx  
J X
— J  (m(x) x — m(x) fi) dx 
=  f  m ( x ) x d x , (3.22)
J X
where the third line follows from the fact when we integrate the conditional mean of 
next period’s sales over all possible sales this period we get the unconditional mean. 
In other words,
m (x)d x  = 0. (3.23)
i
From Proposition 3.4.5, it follows that an increase in the sales realisation leads to a 
target inventory, n, which is at least as high as that without the increase. Therefore, 
the conditional mean m(x)  is nondecreasing in x. Moreover, since the firm does not 
always put up n for sale, it must be true that m(n) > 0. This implies that there 
is a sale, w € [z,h] such that for all x > w, the conditional expectation of next 
period’s differential between sales and the unconditional mean of sales is positive,
i.e. m(n) > 0. Thus, positive weight is attached to higher values of x and the same
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This paper has presented a model of inventory investment in which the firm’s access 
to external sources of finance is constrained. This model can explain the excess vari­
ance of production puzzle, and yields the prediction of positive co-variation between 
inventory investment and sales. Both of these facts are widely reported, and contra­
dict the predictions of the standard Linear-Quadratic model of inventory investment. 
An equally important result derived from the model is that the endogenous sales 
process exhibits positive serial correlation, even though the underlying (and unob­
servable) demand process is exogenously specified to be serially uncorrelated.
The intuition behind these results was illustrated with an example. In that example, 
after a low sales realization, the firm is left simultaneously with a low level of internal 
funds and a high level of depreciation. Consequently, it does not have sufficient funds 
to be able to replace both the goods that were sold and those which depreciated. 
Therefore, the firm underproduces. After a medium sales realization, the firm has 
more revenue from sales and less depreciation occurs. In these circumstances, the 
firm could overproduce if it chose to do so. After a very high sales realization, the 
firm neither overproduces nor underproduces since it has more than enough funds 
to provide the first best amount of goods for sale. Thus, since underproduction is 
associated with low sales realizations and overproduction with medium sales real­
izations, the financing constraints effectively cause the distribution of production to 
be a mean-preserving spread of the sales distribution, thereby explaining the excess 
variance of production puzzle.
J  m(x) x dx > 0 .
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3.A A ppendix A
In this section, we demonstrate that there are only four independent conditions 
which must be satisfied in order for the postulated policy to be optimal. First 
we compute the difference in value between the equivalence classes of states. The 
difference between the first two classes is given by
v2 - v i =  |(1 -  (/>o)(t>3  -  v2) +  fa], (3.25)
A demand of 1  or 2 , which happens with probability ( 1  — </>o), brings a firm from 
equivalence class v2 to class U3 , but a firm from V\ only into v2. Moreover, the former 
enjoys one unit of consumption if demand is 2  (probability <j>2).
For the difference between the second and the third class we have
v3 - v 2 = /3[<j>0(v2 -  vi) +  ( 1  -  <£0)]. (3.26)
A demand of 1  or 2, which happens with probability ( 1  — </>o), yields a firm from 
equivalence class v$ one consumption unit more than a firm from v2. Moreover, with 
zero demand (probability (j>2), the former ends up in v2 whereas the latter is thrown 
back to v\.
Thus, we obtain a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns v2 — v\ and 
V3 — v2, the solution to which is given by
P \  1 -
« * - « » =  l - W o ( l - 0o) ’ <3'27)
and
P 2<t>o<l>2 +  -  4>o) (3.28)
3 2 1 - -  *, )  1 1
Let us assume parameter values {p,/?,</>o,< i^,< 2^ } =  {2,0.96,0.15,0.25,0.6}. Substi­
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tuting them into (3.27) and (3.28) yields
v2 — Vi =  1.4072
and
V3 — v2 = 1.0266,
respectively. Stepping into the next higher equivalence class, v4, simply means an 
additional unit of consumption, and therefore V4 — V3 =  1 < 1.0266 < 1.4072. 
The same is true for the difference between v$ and v4. Thus, the value increments 
are strictly decreasing over the first four equivalence classes and remain constant 
thereafter. This illustrate the strict concavity of the value function in the range of 
assets for which the constraint c >  0  is binding and its linearity beyond that region.
For the same reasons as in the unconstrained model, it is never optimal to choose 
n > 2  or n =  0. However, due to the the additional constraint it is no longer 
preferable to always set s =  0 .
That it is still optimal to provide n =  2 whenever possible is shown in the following 
arguments. Consuming the resource unit freed up by providing only n =  1  instead 
is not optimal if and only if
1 <  P[(\ — (f>o)(v3 — v2) +  4>2 ]. (3.29)
Since 1  <  1.4137, this is clearly the case with our parameter values.
Due to the decreasing increments in value established above the change in expected 
valuation from saving it (rather than investing it in production) is bounded by 
(3[fa{v2 — ^ 1 ) +  ( ^ 3  — V3) +  <£2 ( ^ 3  — U4 )]. The second term is, of course, zero, and
stated here only for expositional reasons. If the demand shock is equal to 1 the firm 
will end up in state ( 1 , 2 ) regardless of its decisions about saving and investment.
Since V3 — v4 =  —1 , this expression is negative if and only if
fa > fa(v2 - v ^ . (3.30)
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For our parameter values this translates to 0.6 > 0 .2 1 1 1 . Thus, it is optimal to 
set n*(N, S)  =  2 V ((?, M)  such that this is feasible. It can be shown that, as a 
consequence, 29 out of the 40 feasible actions can be excluded from the optimal set 
on those grounds.
Next consider states (0,4) and (1,3), where n = 2 is clearly feasible and will therefore 
be chosen. Instead of setting (n ,s ,c) =  (2,1,1) the firm’s decision could choose 
(n, s, c) =  (2,2,0). This is dominated by the former choice if and only if
/?[$o(v3 — vi) +  <£i +  <^2 ] < 1>
or
(3<j>o(v3  -  v2) < 1 -  (3(1 -  <j>0). (3.31)
which is equivalent to 0.9638 < 1, given I \
For (2,0,2) not to be better than (2,1,1),
(3[<j>0 ( ^ 2  — Vi) +  <t>i +  <£2 ] > 1?
or
(3<t>o(v2 -  vi) >  1 -  (3(1 -  <t>Q). (3.32)
must hold (1.0186 > 1 ).
Inequality (3.31) also ensures that in state (0,5) the choice (2,1,2) is preferred to
(2 . 2 . 1 ); and since it implies that
P[4>o(l +  U3  — v2) +  2 </>i +  2<j>2] < 2 ,
(2.1.2) will neither be dominated by (2,3,0). (The additional unit saved has ex­
pected marginal valuation of (3 < 1  as it is used for consumption with certainty next
period.)
Inequality (3.32) is required for (2,0,3) not to be preferred to (2,1,2). Thus, we
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have disposed of another 5 actions.
In (G, M)  =  (1,2), again only choices s.t n =  2 need to be considered. The choice 
of (n ,s ,c) =  (2,1,0) over (n,s ,c)  = (2,0,1) requires (3.32) to hold, which we know 
to be true. Thus, the latter can be eliminated.
That the postulated action (2,0,0) is optimal in the states (0,2) and (2,1) is true 
because all other possibilities involve n < 2  (i.e.. 6  actions excluded).
In the remaining two states, (2,0) and (1,0), (1,0,0) is the only feasible action and 
therefore trivially optimal.
In total we have excluded 29 +  5 +  1 =  35 suboptimal actions, leaving us with 5 
optimal ones across all states.
3.B A ppendix B 
P roof of Propostion  3.4.1
Due to the non-negativity constraints (3 .2 ) and (3.3), the state space for this problem 
is bounded below by zero. We assume arbitrary upper bounds to the state space, 
M  and G . 1 9  W ith this assumption it is straightforward to show that the conditions 
for Lemma 9.5 and Theorem 9.6 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) (pp.261-64) 
are satisfied. Thus, the Bellman operator defined on the right-hand side of (3.13) is 
a contraction mapping with a unique fixed point.
Because of the law of motion for money (3.7), the one period return to the firm, 
M  — s — (n — G +  <^(G)), and the feasibility constraints are all increasing in the 
state variable, M, v is also increasing in M  by theorem 9.7 in Stokey, Lucas, and 
Prescott (1989) (p.264). Similarly, since the law of motion for goods (3.8), and the 
firm’s one-period return are also increasing in G, v is increasing in G as well.
19Below we show that solution to the problem is characterised by upper bounds on n and s, 
which implies that M  and G  are bounded, too.
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3.C A ppendix C
In this section we prove that inequality 3.17 holds. First, note that for very small / i ,  
the decrease of the first term of the left-hand side due to the change p in the (upper) 
integral boundary is offset by the increase of the second term  of the left-hand side 
due to the same change p in the (lower) integral boundary.
Since v is strictly concave when the non-negativity constraint on consumption is 
binding, the stockout terms (without probabilities) of the two inequalities compare 
as follows:
v(0 ,s+e-\-(p—l)p-\-pn) —u(0 ,s+e+ pn) <  v (0 ,s+ (p — \)p+pn) —v(0,s+pn).  (3.33)
Moreover, conditional on not stocking out, reducing n in favour of s is at least as 
valuable at lower savings as it is at higher savings (because of depreciation). Hence, 
V z <  n — p,
v (n —p —z, s+e+p+pz)  —v(n—2 , s+e+pz)  <  v (n—p —z, s+p+pz)  —v(n —z, s-\-pz).
(3.34)
This is true because, by approximating both sides of the inequality arbitrarily closely, 
we can rewrite it as
— [v(n—z, s+e-\-pz)—v{n—p —z, s-\-e-\-pz)\p-\-[v(n—z, s+e+p-\-pz)—v(n—z, s+e+pz)]p
< — [v(n — z , s  +pz)  — v(n — p — z, s-\-pz)]p +  [v(n — z, s +  p + pz) — v(n — z ,s  +pz)]p,
(3.35)
or
[v(n — z, s +  e -f p-\-pz) — v(n — z , s  -f e + pz)\ — [u(n — 2 , s + p +pz)  — v(n — 2 , s-\-pz)\
<  [v(n — z, s-\-e+pz) — v(n — p — z, s+ e+ p z)] — [v(n — z,s-\-pz) — v(n — p — z 1s+pz)].
(3.36)
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Due to strict concavity of v, both sides of the inequality measure the extent to 
which the value gain, due to the funds being larger by e, is reduced by an increase 
in savings and production, respectively. More precisely, the left-hand side of the 
inequality represents the decrease in the value gain (implied by an e-increase ) that 
stems from adding even more funds, /i, to savings. The right-hand side is equal 
to the decrease in the value gain (implied by an e-increase) due to an increase y  
of the target inventory. The former decrease is larger in absolute terms since the 
gross unit return on additional savings y  is 1  V 2 , whereas the gross unit return 
on an additional goods provision of y  is strictly smaller than 1  for at least some 2 : 
that do not lead to a stockout. An analogous argument can be made when there 
is a jump from state (G, M)  to a state (G +  e, M ), as this would be equivalent to 
leaving G unchanged and increasing M  by some fraction of e (which depends on the 
depreciation technology).
Chapter 4
A N ew  Test for Capital M arket 
Im perfections
4.1 Introduction
Since the publication of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), a large empirical 
literature on investment and financing constraints has developed. The overwhelm­
ing majority of these papers report findings which support the conclusion that the 
investment expenditures of some firms are constrained by their inability to raise 
sufficient amounts of external finance. Yet despite the preponderance of papers 
reporting such findings, many economists remain skeptical of this conclusion . 1
The source of much of this skepticism can be traced to an identification problem. 
The main prediction distinguishing financially constrained from unconstrained firms 
is the following: shocks to a constrained firm’s supply of internal finance will affect 
its investment expenditures even if they do not alter its expectations of the future 
profitability of its investment opportunities. This is not true of unconstrained firms . 2
1Indeed, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) go so far as to allege that “it is likely that a publication 
selection bias exists in this literature.”
2This prediction may also be caused by an agency problem between the managers and the owners 
of a firm, referred to as the problem of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)). Both explanations of this 
empirical prediction, capital market imperfections and free cash flow, share the same identification
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Therefore, to test whether or not a firm is financially constrained, supply shocks 
to internal finance first must be identified, then their correlation with investment 
examined. Sceptics argue that the identification problem has not yet been solved.
Existing tests can be roughly classified into two categories: reduced-form tests, and 
structural tests. A generic drawback of reduced-form tests is that one cannot give a 
specific economic interpretation to the regression coefficients. Papers in the financ­
ing constraints literature attem pt to mitigate this problem by first splitting their 
samples into different classes of firms, then comparing the magnitudes of coefficients 
across classes. Differences in the magnitude on cash flow variables are interpreted as 
evidence of financing constraints. However, reduced-form coefficients are functions 
of the structural parameters of the underlying economic model. Differences in co­
efficient magnitudes may also be explained by differences in the values assumed by 
these parameters in different samples. Since the identification problem is not solved, 
it is unclear that any of the difference in coefficient magnitudes can be attributed 
to financing constraints. To ascribe the difference to financing constraints, it must 
be assumed that the unidentified structural parameters are identical across different 
samples of firms.
The second group of tests are based on structural investment models, and thus 
are robust to this critique . 3  However, these tests are indirect because they test 
investment models under the assumption of perfect capital markets. The basic 
assumptions of the investment model, the assumptions required to derive testable 
restrictions from the model, and the assumption of perfect capital markets all enter 
the null hypothesis of these tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis may therefore 
be due to a violation of any of these assumptions. Indeed, some of the assumptions 
made in order to derive testable restrictions are particularly restrictive, and therefore 
likely to be rejected. Moreover, it is not possible to identify which restriction has 
been rejected from other empirical results (such as coefficient magnitudes).
problem.
3Most existing work in the literature has used the neo-classical Adjustment Costs model (e.g. 
Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Hayashi (1982)).
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The financing constraints test developed in this chapter is both structural and direct. 
That is, one of the assumptions in the null hypothesis of this test is that capital 
markets are imperfect. Thus, since failure to reject the null implies that the data is 
consistent with all of the assumptions which make up the null hypothesis, this test 
is robust to the criticism made of existing structural tests.
The test is based on a modified version of the neo-classical Adjustment Costs model. 
One of the modifications is the introduction of two disturbance terms to the model, 
one of which is non-stationary. It is assumed that both disturbances are observable 
by the firm, and that their innovations are orthogonal. Realisations of the non- 
stationary disturbance permanently affect the levels of variables such as profits, sales, 
and physical capital. However, although these variables are non-stationary, their 
ratios are stationary. In other words, the logs of these variables are cointegrated.
A vector moving-average representation is derived for the first difference of the log of 
cash flow, and the log of the cash-flow capital ratio. When the firm is unconstrained, 
both of these variables are endogenous in the sense that each Granger causes the 
other. One way to understand this is that both cash flow and the capital stock 
adjust in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two 
variables. Moreover, since both disturbances have a transitory effect on the cash 
flow-capital ratio, but only the non-stationary disturbance has a permanent effect 
on the level of cash flow, the identification restriction of Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
can be used recover the structural disturbances from actual data.
In contrast, when financing constraints are binding, the first difference of the log of 
cash flow is exogenous. In other words, it is not Granger caused by the log of the 
cash flow-capital ratio. This is because, when financing constraints are binding, the 
firm spends all of its available profits on investment. Therefore, the only variable 
which is correcting the error in the long-run equilibrium between the two variables 
is the capital stock. Moreover, in this system both structural disturbances have a 
long-run effect on the level of cash flow. Thus, a Blanchard-Quah decomposition of 
cash flow does not exist, and the structural disturbances are unidentified.
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To test whether the data of a group of firms is consistent with the hypothesis that 
those firms are financially constrained, one tests the null hypothesis that the first 
difference of the log of cash flow is not Granger caused by the log of the cash flow- 
capital ratio. Granger causality tests are very common and easily implemented. 
Therefore, an additional strength of this test is its simplicity.
The test was performed on an unbalanced panel of US manufacturing firms sampled 
at a quarterly frequency between 1980 and 1992. The sample was stratified according 
to three criteria: size, existence of a bond rating, and existence of a commercial paper 
rating. For the sample of small firms, and the sample of firms without a bond rating, 
the null hypothesis that the cash flow-capital ratio does not Granger cause the first 
difference of cash flow fails to be rejected. For both the sample of large firms, and the 
sample of firms with a bond rating, the null hypothesis is easily rejected. The null 
hypothesis is also rejected for both samples of firms with and without commercial 
paper ratings.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
investment model, states the main theoretical propositions, In the third section the 
financing constraints test is derived. In the following section the data is described, 
and the Granger causality tests run. The final section concludes. Proofs of all 
propositions are found in the Appendix.
4.2 A M odified Adjustm ent Costs M odel o f Investm ent
By far the most widely used model in the empirical literature on financing constraints 
is the Adjustment Costs model of Investment, which was first introduced by Eisner 
and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967) and Gould (1968). What can be uncontroversially 
concluded from the results in this literature is that the model does not explain the 
data very well, particularly for firm classified a priori as financially constrained. The 
controversy surrounding this literature has to do with its attribution of the model’s 
failure to the violation of the perfect capital markets assumption. This assumption is
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one of several in the joint null hypotheses tested in the literature. The following three 
assumptions, in addition to the perfect capital markets assumption, underlie what 
will be referred to as the standard formulation of the Adjustment Costs model: 4  (i) 
linearity of the firm’s reduced-form profit function, (ii), stationarity of the stochastic 
processes governing the exogenous disturbances, and (iii), no fixed costs of adjusting 
the firm’s capital stock. Violation of any of these three assumptions would lead to 
a rejection of the model.
In designing a new test for financing constraints it is desirable to use a model 
which can potentially explain existing results without appealing to capital market 
imperfections. In order to do so, the model used in this paper changes the first 
two assumptions. The popularity of the first assumption is derived from the result 
that under it, unobservable marginal q and observable average q are equivalent 
(Hayashi (1982), Lucas and Prescott (1971)). However, known conditions which 
ensure that the profit function is linear are quite restrictive. The firm must have 
a constant returns to scale production technology, and act as a price taker in both 
factor and output markets. In this chapter, the profit function is assumed to be 
strictly concave in the capital stock, which does not require both conditions to be 
satisfied simultaneously.
The assumption made in this model that one of the underlying disturbances is non- 
stationary can ultimately be justified on empirical grounds. Indeed, as will be shown 
later, for a substantial fraction of firms in the dataset used in the empirical analysis, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in both the cash flow and capital stock series cannot 
be rejected. However, it is also an assumption which is particularly germane to the 
issue of financing constraints. It is likely that a high growth rate is an important 
characteristic of firms which are classified as constrained. Not all papers in the 
literature have reported the growth rates of the firms in their samples, but of those 
that have, it is typically the case that the average growth rate of constrained firms
4A11 of the papers in the financing constraints literature incorporate at least one of these as­
sumptions into their null hypotheses.
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is higher than that of unconstrained firms . 5
The focus on growing firms is sensible, since a firm’s demand for capital must be 
high enough to make potential financing constraints bind (or very nearly bind). 
However, there is no good reason to assume that this growth is deterministic. Indeed, 
there are reasons to prefer the choice of stochastic growth in a model of investment 
aimed at explaining the behaviour of firms which have been classified as constrained 
in the financing constraints literature. One would expect that external investors 
have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of constrained firms as opposed to 
unconstrained firms. While this difficulty may in part be due to a shortage of data, 
a unit root in the firms’ reported earnings series will add to the uncertainty of the 
forecasts. Moreover, as mentioned above, if some firms are growing stochastically, 
this will lead to a rejection of the some of the testable restrictions derived from 
the standard formulation of the Adjustment Costs model. For example, in the 
model in this paper, both average q and the cash flow-capital ratio are sufficient 
statistics for the investment rate of unconstrained firms. This provides an alternative 
explanation of why the cash-flow capital ratio has been found to be so im portant in 
explaining the investment behaviour of firms classified as constrained. Thus, from a 
methodological perspective, a reason to prefer the assumption of stochastic growth 
is that it can explain some of the findings in this literature without having to resort 
to the assumption of imperfect capital markets.
4.2.1 The Investm ent M odel
This section outlines the model of investment without financing constraints, and 
derives some basic theoretical results. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The key components of the Adjustment Costs model are the functions describing
5This is certainly true of the original Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) article. Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) investigate the importance of firm growth rates in their critique of that article. They 
conclude that “any splitting criterion that sorts firms into subsamples with differential outliers in 
growth rates...m ay be biased toward finding a difference in coefficients on cash flow. This bias may 
partially account for the large body of evidence finding a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity  
in fast growing companies, that tend to be classified as financially constrained.”
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the firm’s profits (per time period) and the costs of adjusting the stock of physical 
capital, as well as the stochastic processes governing the exogenous shocks. The 
firm’s profits in period t are represented by the function Tl(Kt, 9t) : 5ft++ x 5ft++-» 5ft, 
where K t is the capital stock, and 9t is an exogenous random variable. The profit 
function is assumed to be increasing in both variables, and, as mentioned above, 
concave in the capital stock, K t. In addition, it is assumed to be concave in and 
linear homogeneous in both K t and 9t. As only the capital stock and profits are 
observable, the linear homogeneity assumption is, in effect, a normalisation of 9.
9 is an exogenous non-stationary disturbance which follows the process given by
Ot
=  £«• (4.1)
The term p  =  log(/x) is an i.i.d. innovation distributed over support [p, p] with 
continuous density function 4>(p). It does not necessarily have mean zero.
The final modification to the standard Adjustment Costs model is the introduction 
of a transitory component to the firm’s earnings. This is done by redefining the firm’s 
profits to be fjtH(Kt, 0<), where rjt = e77*, and 77 is a white noise process distributed 
over support [77, 77] with continuous density function <-p{rf). It is assumed that the 
firm can observe both shocks.
Adjustment costs are assumed to be the same as in the standard formulation of 
the model. Let ^ ( I , K )  represent the nominal costs of adjusting the capital stock 
where I  is real investment. ^ ( / ,  K)  is homogeneous of degree one in I  and K.  For 
some a E (0,1), lim/_>aA' ^ / ( f ,  K)  =  0 0 . The price of capital is assumed to be an 
exogenously given constant which is normalised to 1. Therefore, the total amount 
spent on investment in period t is given by I t +  ^(A , K t).
The discount factor is given by j3. It is assumed that capital does not depreciate. 
Therefore, the law of motion for the capital stock is given by,
K t+1 = K t + I t . (4.2)
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The firm’s objective is to
max E 0 -  (I, +  . (4-3)
<7'}|=0 \i= o  /
subject to (4.2), and (4.1).
This problem can be solved using dynamic programming techniques. The Bellman 
equation corresponding to this problem is
V ( K t,9t;rjt) = maxjt {rjtII(Kt , 9t) -  (It +  * ( / , ,  K t)
+ P J  J v ( K t + u etfit+i \rj t+i)<l>(fi)ip(rf)dfidri}
subject to (4.2).
The first proposition establishes the existence of the solution to this equation, and 
some of its properties.
Proposition 4.2.1 There exists a unique function, V(K,9;rj),  which solves the 
Bellman equation. This function has the following properties.
1. V(K,9;rj) is homogeneous of degree one in K  and 9.
2. is increasing.
3. V(',9;r)) is strictly concave.
4. The optimal investment policy correspondence, I*(K , 9), is a continuous single­
valued function which is homogeneous of degree 1 in (K,9).
5. V(K,9\r]) is differentiable with respect to K.
Any sequence of the capital stock generated by the policy function I*(K , 9)
and equation (4.1) obviously will be non-stationary. However, it can be shown that 
a stationary solution for the sequence { (K / 9)t}^l0 exists. To do this it is convenient 
to make the following definitions. Let k = y ,  i =  v(k) =  V {k , 1 ), ip(i) =  W(z, 1 )
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and 7r(Ar) =  n(/s, 1). Using these definitions and the linear homogeneity of the value 
function, we can rewrite the Bellman equation as
v(kt, rjt) = m.ax Ujt^(h)  -  (* +  $(*<))** +  P J  J  u(fci+i;i?t+i)/i(+i <j>(n) tp(r)) dp drij ,
(4.4)
subject to
I (1 +  **)^ (A K\*t+i =  — —  (4.5)
Vt+i
and (4.1).
It is relatively straightforward to show that a stationary distribution for k  exists. 
This result is stated in Proposition (4.2.2).
Proposition 4.2.2 There exists a unique invariant distribution f o r k  over the finite 
interval [fc, k]
The  first order condition for this problem is
1 +  xj)\it) =  p  J  J  v' r) t + 1 j  </>(n) (p(rj) dp dr). (4.6)
To understand how the model works, first note that for each value of 9, there is a 
unique value of K  which maximize II(K, 9). Consider an above average realisation of 
Pt+i- Since p, is white noise, the expectation of does not affect i t . However, from 
equation (4.5), a high realisation of p t+i lowers ki+1 . Note that the strict concavity 
of V(K, 9\ rj) with respect to K  implies that v'(k; rf) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, 
an above average realisation of p t + 1  increases the marginal value of capital in period 
t +  1. This induces an immediate increase in i t+1 which, because of the one period 
lag before new capital becomes productive, lowers the marginal value of capital in 
period t + 2 cateris paribus. If there were no costs of adjusting the capital stock, the 
marginal value of capital would be an i.i.d. process (and if newly installed capital 
immediately became productive it would be constant). Given that p is assumed to 
be i.i.d., richer dynamics in the series of the marginal value of capital and other
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endogenous variables are due to adjustment costs. The assumptions made about 
adjustment costs imply that the capital stock gradually adjusts towards its new 
optimal level.
There are several features of this formulation of the Adjustment Costs model which 
are interesting to contrast with the standard formulation. First, note that from 
equation (4.6), the optimal investment function i*(k) is a strictly decreasing func­
tion of k. Therefore, any monotonic function of k will be a sufficient statistic for 
investment, I / K .  Since U / K  =  11(1, Ac-1), and U(K, 0) is strictly increasing in its 
second argument, U / K  is strictly decreasing in k. A similar argument is true for 
V(K,9) .  Hence, both U / K  and V / K  are sufficient statistics for investment. In the 
standard formulation of the model only average q, V /K ,  is a sufficient statistic for 
I / K .
This is the same result as that derived in Caballero and Leahy (1996) under the 
assumption of fixed costs of adjustment. As discussed in that paper, the sufficiency 
result depends on the ability of both models to reduce the investment problem 
down to a problem with only one state variable, which, in turn, depends on the 
assumptions of linear homogeneity and of i.i.d. disturbances. If either of these 
assumptions are dropped, then there will be more than one state variable in the 
problem. In these circumstances, it is likely that no single observable variable will 
act as a sufficient statistic for investment. Rather, several regressors will be required 
to “summarise” all the information relevant to investment demand.
This result has serious implications for the interpretations given to some empirical 
results in the financing constraints literature. Typical results in the literature on 
financing constraints are that when both U / K  and V / K  are included as regressors 
with I / K  as the dependent variable, both are statistically significant. While this is a 
rejection of the standard formulation of the model, it does not reject this formulation 
of the model. Therefore, what has been interpreted as evidence of imperfect capital 
markets may instead be evidence that other assumptions in the standard formulation 
are invalid.
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In fairness, the capital market imperfections interpretation rests not only on the 
rejection of the standard formulation, but also on a comparison of the coefficients 
on the H / K  term across different classes of firms. This coefficient is much larger 
for the groups of firms classified a priori as constrained than for other groups of 
firms. However, it is improper to base statistical inference about the validity of an 
economic model on comparisons of reduced-form coefficient magnitudes. Differences 
in the magnitudes of these reduced-form coefficients may simply be due to differences 
in the values assumed by the structural parameters across groups. Thus, the error 
in ascribing differences in these magnitudes to differences in cost premia on external 
finance may be understood as a version of the Lucas critique.
A second feature of this formulation which differs from that of the standard formu­
lation is that average q, marginal q, and the average and marginal profitability of 
capital are endogenous . 6  In the standard formulation, they are all functions only of 
the exogenous disturbances. This is due to the assumption that the profit function 
is linear in capital. Therefore, in the standard formulation, shocks to marginal q 
induce a change in investment, but investment has no effect on marginal q. One 
of the implications of this assumption is that the exogenous disturbances affecting 
marginal q must be stationary in order for ratios of observable variables such as 
average q and U / K  to be stationary. In contrast, in this formulation both variables 
affect each other. Indeed, it is the effect of investment which causes marginal q to 
return to its unconditional mean. It is perhaps more intuitive to think of the process 
for the marginal value of capital as being driven by the reaction of investment to 
exogenous changes in the firm’s set of investment opportunities, rather than as a 
strictly exogenous process.
Indeed, investment plays a crucial role in the stationarity of this problem. Note that 
since V(K,Q) = A'V(1,A;-1), proposition (4.2.2) implies that the ratio V ( K , 0 ) ! K  
is stationary random variable. The same is true for the ratios I J K  and H /K .  By
6Endogeneity is used here in the economic sense associated with the idea of Granger causality 
(see Sargent (1987)). In both models, it is likely that these variables will be endogenous in the 
econometric sense. That is, they are likely to be correlated with the error term in an investment 
regression.
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construction, none of the variables in the model are stationary in log levels. However, 
they are all stationary in log differences. Therefore, an implication of this model is 
that the log levels of J, V, K,  n  are cointegrated, and that the cointegrating vector 
between each pair is (1, —1). Viewing the model from this perspective, the structural 
shocks p and 77 drive the ratios away from their unconditional means. However, 
there are two components of the error correction mechanism which maintain the 
cointegrated relationship between V(K,  0), K,  and n ( if ,  6). The first component is 
investment itself. When there is an above average realisation of /z, so that both V / K  
and U / K  are above their equilibrium values, the firm invests, thereby raising the 
level of K , until both ratios return to their equilibrium. The second component of 
the error correction mechanism is the decay of the stationary shock 77. Consider the 
impulse response of these ratios to a shock in 77. Since 77 is white noise, the initial 
shock drives the ratio away from its equilibrium value for only the first period, after 
which the equilibrium is restored.
4.2.2 The Financially Constrained M odel
The ultimate goal of this model is to form the basis of a test for capital market 
imperfections. Consequently, the discussion of a financially constrained firm is re­
stricted to the simplest possible model. As will be shown below, the modelling 
assumptions made in this section are sufficient for the derivation of a testable re­
striction to distinguish constrained from unconstrained firms. Whether or not this 
restriction can also be derived from more general models of financially constrained 
firms must be left for future research.
The key feature of the investment behaviour of constrained firms which the test 
exploits is the exhaustion of the firm’s (cheaper) internal funds. Thus, the financing 
constraint imposed is assumed to take an extremely simple form. In a given period 
a firm cannot spend more on investment than a given proportion, A E (0,1), of the 
profits it earns in that period. In other words, the constraint
rjtU(Ku et) - I t -  n i t ,  Kt)  >  ( 1  “  A)P&n(tft, 6t)), (4.7)
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must be satisfied in every period. The firm neither has access to external funds, 
nor can it save. More general financing constraints would permit access to external 
finance at a premium. An interpretation of this constraint is that the cost premium 
on external finance is infinite. The term  on the right-hand side of the above in­
equality can be interpreted as minimum dividend payment the firm must make to 
its owners. The size of this payment as a proportion of earnings, 1  — A, is determined 
outside the model.
Thus, the problem facing a constrained firm is to maximise (4.3) subject to (4.2),
(4.5), and (4.7).
P ro p o sitio n  4.2.3 There exists a unique function, V{K^9^rj), which solves the 
Bellman equation (4-4) subject to (4 .2), (4-5) and (4-7) . This function has the 
following properties.
1. V(K,0,r]) is homogeneous of degree one in K  and 6.
2. !/(•,•, 77) is increasing.
3. is strictly concave.
4 . The optimal investment policy correspondence, /*(A’, # ,77), is a continuous 
single-valued function which is homogeneous of degree 1.
A key difference between the unconstrained and constrained problems is that it 
cannot be proven that the value function is differentiable in the solution to latter. 
This greatly restricts one’s ability to characterise the optimal investment function. 
In turn, knowledge of this function greatly simplifies both the proof of a station­
ary distribution for k in the constrained case, and the derivation of the financing 
constraints test. Therefore, the remainder of the discussion will focus on the case 
where the financing constraint (4.7) binds in every period. When this is the case, 
inequality (4.7) becomes an equality which implicitly defines the optimal investment 
function.
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To establish the existence of a stationary distribution for k for the case where the 
financing constraint always binds, first it must be shown that there exists a specifi­
cation of the model (i.e. a vector of parameter values) such that desired investment 
expenditures exceed profits in every period. The next lemma establishes that result. 
Proposition (4.2.5) then states the desired result for this case.
L em m a 4.2 .4  In the solution to the unconstrained problem, for each rj E tZ>*7] 
there exists a value ofk ,  k(r}), such that \rjTr(k(r)))/k(r}) = i(k(r})) + il>{i(k(r]))), and 
for k < k{rj), Xr]7r(k)/k < i(k) +  %l){i(k)). There exists a specification of the model 
in the constrained problem in which kc < k(fj), where kc is the upper bound of the 
distribution of the state variable k in the constrained problem.
According to lemma (4.2.4) over the interval (0, ^(77)) the firm would like to spend 
more than Xr}n(k)/k on installing new capital. Thus, for values of k  in this region, the 
financing constraint (4.7) would be binding. The second part of the lemma states 
that we can find a A E (0,1) such that the stationary distribution for the state 
variable in the constrained problem kc, [kc,kc] E (0, k(rj)). The financing constraint 
will always be binding for such a firm. The next proposition states that there are 
specifications of the support for p such that in these circumstances a stationary 
distribution for k still exists.
P ro p o s itio n  4.2.5 There exists a unique invariant distribution for k in the con­
strained problem over the finite interval [kc, kc].
We now have all of the information about the solution to the firm’s investment 
problem required for a test to distinguish between the two cases.
4.3 A  Test for Financing Constraints
The methodology of the test is to demonstrate that when the financing constraint 
always binds, this places a testable restriction on the Wold representation of a given
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vector process of observable variables generated by the investment model. This 
is done by first deriving the “true” representation of the process when constraints 
never bind, and then when they always bind. The “true” representation refers to 
the MA representation with the error vector (/j*, 77*)'. It is then shown th a t the 
difference in these representations imply a testable difference in the corresponding 
Wold representations.
As a first step in deriving the “true” representations, consider the law of motion for 
the state variable k. Taking logs of equation (4.5) gives
log(A;t) =  log(l +  i(kt- 1 )) +  log(fct_i) -  log fit . (4.8)
Since the optimal policy function i*(k) is monotonically decreasing in k , we can let 
f(\og(kt~i)) = i*(exp(log(fcf_i)). Taking a first order Taylor expansion around the 
unconditional mean of k , we get,
i*(kt.  1 ) -  i*(k) =  f(log(k))(\og(kt- i )  -  log(k)). (4.9)
Noting that log(l +  i*(kt~i)) «  i*(kt~ 1 ) we can rewrite equation (4.8) as
log(Art) =  8 +  plog(A;t_i) -  /i*, (4.10)
where 8 =  i*(k) +  /'(log(fc)) and p =  (1 -f / /(log(^)))? and where p  =  log(/2). Note 
that since i*(k) is decreasing, f '(log(k)) < 0, and therefore p < 1. The constant 
term 8 can also incorporate the unconditional mean of p if it is not equal to zero.
Define CFt =  fjtU(Kt,0t). Using this definition, we can derive the following equa­
tions,
A log(C i;i)t =  aAlog(fc)* + p t +  Arjt, (4.11)
log( C F / K ) t = (a  -  1) log(A0t +  vt- (4.12)
With these equations and equation (4.10), we can derive a vector moving-average
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representation for (A log((7F)t, log(CF/K)tY.  For simplicity, assume that the func­
tional form taken by the profit function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e. U(Kt, Of) =  K?6^~a\  
With this assumption, ( Alog(C'F)*, \og(CF/K)t )' is a vector ARMA(1,1), and has 
the following moving average representation,
AlogCCF,) l - o t + ( o t - p ) L  (l-p)(l-L) 1—pL  1—pL
_ log(C F /K ) t 1
r-HIf1 . Vt
where \og(CF/K)t  now represents deviations from its unconditional mean. Since 
log(CF)t and log(K ) t are cointegrated, A log{CF)t and A log(K ) t will have a vector 
error-correction representation. Equation (4.13) is referred to as the companion 
form to the error-correction representation, and is easily derived from the latter (see 
Cochrane (1997)).
W hat does the moving-average representation (4.13) imply about the Wold repre­
sentation for the process? Note that the polynomial in the upper right corner has 
a unit root. This implies that rj has no long-run effect on the level of log((7F). 
Thus, the restriction used in Blanchard and Quah (1989) can be used to recover 
the “true” representation (4.13) from the Wold representation. In effect, this iden­
tification restriction performs a particular type of orthogonal permanent-transitory 
decomposition of the log(C'F) series. The investment model implies that when the 
firm is unconstrained such a decomposition exists for log(C'F). From Theorem 4.1 
in Quah (1992), such a decomposition for log(C'F) exists if and only if \og(CF/ K ) t 
Granger causes Alog(C'F)*.7 Thus, in a regression of A log(C 'F)t on its own lags 
and lags of \og(CF/ K ) t, the latter group of terms should be jointly significant if the 
firm is unconstrained.
7The essence of the proof of this theorem is that there is a unique orthonormal matrix, Q , which 
transforms the Wold representation of ( A log(C F )* , log( C F / K ) t )' into its “true” representation 
(4.13). If log( C F / K ) t does not Granger cause A lo g (C F )t , then the polynomial matrix associated 
with the Wold representation is lower triangular. This implies that Q  is the identity matrix, 
and therefore that the polynomial matrix associated with the true representation is also lower 
triangular. In this case, the innovation to the stationary disturbance does not affect A lo g (C F )t , 
and therefore log(C F ) has no transitory component.
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W hat happens to the representation (4.13) when the financing constraint always 
binds? To answer this question, first note that when the financing constraint always 
binds, inequality (4.7) becomes an equation which implicitly defines the optimal 
investment function. To make this explicit, we assume that the costs-of-adjustment 
function takes the form, ip(i) := e x p (^ i^ )  — i. This allows the optimal investment 
function to be written as,
i =  a +  7  log
Xf j U( K, e )
(4.14)
Notice that the firms investment policy is now a function of the transitory shocks, 
77, even though this shock contains no information regarding the future marginal 
profitability of capital. Assuming the same Cobb-Douglas functional form for the 
profit function, and following the same procedure as above, the vector moving- 
average representation for ( A log(C 'F)f , log(CF/K)t )' is now given by,
Alog(CF,) (l-a+(or-p)L) (1-(1-7)L)(1-L) ' Pt_ 1—pL 1—pL
_ log(CF/K), 1—or1—pL
1-L
1—pL . Vt .
(4.15)
where p =  1  — ( 1  — 0 )7 .
Let et =  ( 1  — a)pt +  (1 — L)r}t. Then the above representation can be re-written as,
A log(CFt) (l-ar+(a-p)L) q (l-a)(l-pL) U







Two features of the representation in (4.16) are notable. The first is that the error 
term e* is a linear combination of the structural errors p  and 77. In other words, 
both errors have the same effect on the observable variables in the system. This is 
because both variables affect investment. For a given value of (ATt_i,0*_i), we can 
see that total investment is determined by the realisation of the vector disturbance 
(/it, 77*). However, any realisation of this vector such that \ f}H(K,0)  =  b for some 
b > 0 will lead to the same amount of investment when the firm is constrained. The
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true structural errors are thus indistinguishable. In particular, since the polynomial 
in the first row of the matrix in equation (4.16) does not have a unit root, both 
structural disturbances have a permanent effect on log(CF)t.
The second feature is that the elements in the vector error of (4.16) are identical. 
This feature captures the fact that investment is a deterministic function of cash 
flow as seen in equation (4.14). In the constrained system, cash flow is an exogenous 
stochastic process. Since the financing constraint is always binding, the capital 
stock adjusts in a perfectly deterministic way to realisations of cash flow. From 
the perspective of the test, this is the crucial difference between the constrained and 
unconstrained systems. In the unconstrained system, both variables are endogenous. 
The variables in the constrained system, however, are still cointegrated. But only 
the capital stock adjusts to maintain the long-run equilibrium . 8
It is straightforward to show that this representation implies that the polynomial 
matrix of the Wold representation will be diagonal as well. Since the error term  et is 
an MA(1), it can be expressed as et =  ( 1  -fcjL)u*, where vt is serially uncorrelated. 
Expressing the representation (4.16) in terms of Vt gives the Wold representation 
(i.e. the errors are serially uncorrelated, and the matrix polynomial is the identity 
when L — 0). Since this transformation involves multiplying the polynomial matrix 
by the polynomial scalar 1 +o;L, the polynomial matrix for the Wold representation 
is also diagonal. This implies that neither variable Granger causes the other.
Thus, the presence of a financing constraint which is binding in every period places 
very strong restrictions on the Wold representation for ( A log(CfF ) t , log( C F / K )t )'. 
In the theory, the term K t represents the true replacement value of the firm’s capital 
stock in period t (the price of capital was assumed constant and equal to 1). In the 
data, however, the capital stock is almost certainly measured with error . 9  A very
8This can be seen in the error correction representation for (A lo g (C F )t , A lo g (i^ )t)/ . In the 
constrained system, the equilibrium error log(C F )t — log(A’)t enters only in the equation for 
A lo g ( lf ) t . In the unconstrained system, it enters both equations.
9Almost all papers in the empirical literature on investment and in the literature on financing 
constraints have been concerned with measurement error in the capital stock. Many papers use 
complicated algorithms to construct measurements of the replacement value of the capital stock
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pertinent question then is whether these restrictions remain robust to measurement 
error in the capital stock. Suppose that the capital stock is measured with error, and 
that as a result the observed cash flow-capital ratio, log( C F / K ) t , can be written as
log ( C F j K ) t = log ( C F /K ) t +  vt .
This implies that the moving-average representation for ( A log(C F )t , log( C F / K ) t )' 
is given by,
Alog(CFi) ( l - o ,+ ( o - p ) t )  Q( l - a ) ( l - p L  U
log(CF/K)t 1 - f L  1  j
From the theorem in Quah (1992) this representation implies that the Wold repre­
sentation for this process is also lower triangular. Therefore, when the constraint 
is always binding, the observable cash flow-capital ratio does not Granger cause 
A log(CFf). The measurement error does not alter the polynomial matrix in the 
moving-average representation (4.13) for the unconstrained process. However, the 
vector error term becomes (fit, {Vt +  Vt) )'•
Thus, the test of financing constraints which emerges from this model of investment 
is an extremely simple Granger causality test. This can be implemented by estimat­
ing the first equation of the VAR representation of the ( A log(C 'F)t , log( C F / K )t )' 
process, then testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the log( C F / K ) t 
are all zero. This test is structural insofar as the restriction being tested has been 
derived from an economic model of investment. Moreover, since the moving-average 
representation for the process generated by a constrained firm is nested in the rep­
resentation for the process generated by an unconstrained firm, the resulting test 
of financing constraints is a direct one. In other words, if the data from a given 
sample fails to reject the null, then it is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
firms in this sample are financially constrained. This is an improvement on exist­
ing structural tests in the financing constraints literature. These papers only test
from observations on the book value. For a discussion of this in the context of measuring Tobin’s 
<7 , see Perfect and W iles (1994).
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unconstrained investment models. Rejecting the null hypothesis in such framework 
implies only that the data is inconsistent with the unconstrained model. The source 
of the inconsistency, however, remains unidentified.
Several remarks concerning the test must be made. First, the null hypothesis may 
be rejected if equation (4.14) is not exact. If an error term is introduced into 
this equation, then it can be shown that \og(CF/K)t  Granger causes A log(CF)t. 
Thus, the null hypothesis would be rejected even for firms for which the financing 
constraint was binding in every period. The exactness of this equation depends 
upon the assumed functional forms for both the cost-of-adjustment function i>(i), 
and the financing constraint (equation (4.7)). This may make the identification of 
financially constrained firms more difficult. Second, the test is a sufficient condition 
for the identification of financially constrained firms. As such, rejection of the null 
hypothesis cannot be interpreted as evidence that financially constrained firms do 
not exist. Consequently, the test is of limited use in determining the pervasiveness 
of financing constraints in an economy.
4.4 D ata and Empirical R esults
The theory developed above places two main requirements on the data. First, the 
theory is applicable only to firms whose cash flow and capital stock series each have a 
unit root. Since this will not be true of all firms in a randomly selected sample, these 
firms must be identified. This was done by running Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
for each firm individually. The power of these tests depend crucially on the number 
of time series observations for each firm. For this reason, a firm was required to 
have a minimum of 28 consecutive observations to be included in the sample. With 
annual data, this requirement would likely overload the sample with unconstrained 
firms. Therefore, quarterly data was used. Second, the variables in the VAR are 
expressed in logarithms. Consequently, firms must not have negative observations 
on cash flow.
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This section is divided into four parts. The first two deal with sample selection. The 
third section deals with specification tests. In the final section the Granger causality 
tests are run and their results discussed.
4.4.1 Selection Criteria for Sam ples
Compustat quarterly data for US manufacturing firms were used for this empirical 
analysis. To an initial population of 4659 firms, three selection criteria were applied. 
First, firms were required to have at least 28 consecutive observations with the initial 
observation on the capital stock greater than or equal to $2 million. The number 
of firms which met these requirements was 6 6 6 . Second, firms with four or more 
negative observations on cash flow were deleted from this sample, leaving 509 firms. 
Finally, all remaining negative observations on cash flow were removed, and the 28 
consecutive observation rule re-applied. This left a final sample of 375 firms with 
observations ranging from 1980:Q2 to 1992:Q1.
Data on the firms’ cash flow and captial stock were used. Cash flow was measured as 
the firms’ operating income before depreciation. The capital stock was measured as 
the book value of the firms’ property, plant and equipment. The data was deflated 
by the US Producer Price Index. To mitigate the effects of seasonality, the first 
difference of the log of cash flow, and the log of the cash flow-capital ratio were 
regressed on a set of quarterly dummies for each firm individually. The residuals 
from these regressions were then used in the econometric analysis.
To identify sub-samples of firms which a priori are more likely to face financing 
constraints, three different criteria were used: size, existence of a bond rating, and 
existence of a commercial paper rating. These stratification criteria are standard in 
the empirical literature on financing constraints. For the size criterion, the value of 
the firms capital stocks in 1985:Q2 was used (this is the first quarter in which the 
entire cross-section of the panel is observed). The 25th percentile was chosen as the 
cutoff point between small and large firms. For the commercial paper rating, the 
criterion was the existence of either a Standard & Poor’s or a Moody’s rating in at
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least one time period over the window of observation for the firm. For the bond 
rating the criterion was the same, except that only Standard &; Poor’s ratings were 
available.
4.4.2 A ugm ented Dickey-Fuller Test R esults
One of the implications of the theory developed above is that both the logarithms of 
cash flow and of the capital stock are non-stationary and co-integrated. Therefore, a 
necessary precusor to the financing constraints test is to identify the group of firms 
for which these implications hold.
To do so, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted on the log of cash flow, 
the log of the capital stock, and the log of the cash flow-capital stock ratio for each 
firm individually . 1 0  The regression is,
v
A yt = a  +  7 t  +  p0 yt - 1  +  Pk^Vt-k  +  e * .
k = l
In the initial specification, p was set equal to 8 . The following criteria were used 
to choose the optimal value of p for each firm: (i) the final lag of the dependent 
variable was significant at the 5% level (2.048) and (ii), for this specification the 
existence of either first-order or fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals could 
be rejected at the 5% level. If the highest lag at which the dependent variable was 
found to be significant was less than four, and fourth-order serial correlation was 
detected for this specification, then the specification with p =  4 was chosen. If either 
first or fourth-order serial correlation was detected with eight lags of the dependent 
variable, that firm was removed from the sample. This removed a further 39 firms, 
leaving 336 in the sample.
The results of these regressions are summarised in Table 4.1. For cash flow and the 
capital stock, the diagonal elements show the number of firms for which the null
10The first differences of these data were deseasonalised as described above. The levels were 
formed by recursively adding the residuals.
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hypothesis of a unit root failed to be rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The 
diagonal element for the cash flow-capital stock ratio show the number of firms for 
which the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
The off-diagonal elements show the number of firms satisfying both conditions. For 
example, for 113 firms the presence of a unit root failed to be rejected in the capital 
stock series, but was rejected in the cash flow-capital stock series at the 1 % level.
Table 4.1 shows that a majority of firms in this sample have a unit root in either the 
cash flow or the capital stock series. This finding supports the intuition underlying 
the introduction of stochastic growth into the neo-classical Adjustment Costs model 
of investment. That is, it is possible that the presence of such firms in other samples 
have caused reduced-form tests to indicate erroneously that financing constraints 
exist for certain groups of firms.
The results for the cash flow-capital stock ratio show that the presence of a unit 
root in this series was not rejected for a large fraction of firms. For only 36 firms did 
the data reject the null for the cash flow-capital stock ratio series and fail to reject 
for both the cash flow and captial stock series. If the costs of adjusting the capital 
stock are high, or if the lags in responding to new information are significant, or if 
the transitory shock is quite serially persistent, then it may take years for the cash 
flow-capital stock ratio to return to its equilibrium following a shock. These findings 
may also be due to the way the variables are measured.
In order to increase the power of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the cash 
flow-capital ratio, the individual firm t-statistics were aggregated and normalised 
following the procedures in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997). The asymptotic distribu­
tion of this test statistic is standard normal. For the group of 164 firms for which 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected for both the cash flow and capital stock 
series, the test statistic had a value of —27.56.11 Thus, the null hypothesis of a unit
11 The statistic was computed using the values for the first and second moments of the test 
statistic provided in table 4 of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997). Since the specification of the ADF  
regressions was allowed to vary across firms, the values of the first and second moments were 
averaged over different lag lengths for the dependent variable.
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root in the cash flow-capital stock series for this group of firms is clearly rejected.
4.4.3 V A R  S pecification
Based on the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, the most appropriate 
sample for the Granger causality test is the group of 164 firms for which the presence 
of a unit root was rejected for neither the cash flow nor the capital stock series at 
the 1% level. At this stage, a panel data estimator was employed. The first equation 
of the VAR was estimated, namely,
m m  f  C1
A log{C F ) it =  a , +  fa +  £  pi A  log (CF)t_i +  £ ^ l o g  —  +  c*, (4.18)
/ = i  f = i  \  A  /  t - i
where a t is a time dummy, and fa is a firm-specific effect. The Granger causality 
tests were performed by testing for the joint significance of the \og(CF/K)  terms 
using a Wald test.
Estimation was performed with the DPD package of Arellano and Bond (1988).12 
To eliminate the firm-specific effect, fa, equation (4.18) was first differenced. The 
levels of the regressors from lag 2  to m +  2  were specified as instruments. Although 
this estimator is consistent, it is not efficient even amongst linear estimators. Given 
the relatively large number of observations per firm (ranging from 26 to 46), the 
efficient linear estimator proposed originally by Chamberlain (1983) and extended 
to the estimation of VARs by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), requires a very 
large number of instruments. This was found to give very unstable estimates. The 
model was over-identified in order to permit the use of an additional specification 
test, a test on the overidentifying restrictions (referred to as the Sargan statistic 
(Arellano and Bond (1991)). For all sub-samples, this test statistic clearly rejected 
the validity of first differences of the regressors as instruments.
Table 4.2 summarises the specification tests for the various samples. The choice of
12The one-step GMM estimator was used. This estimator is not efficient because it uses an 
arbitrary weighting matrix. See Arellano and Bond (1991) for a discussion.
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optimal lag length, m, was based on a Wald test of the joint significance of both 
A log(C 'F)i_m and log(CF / K ) t- m. The initial value of m was 16. Even though 
the data was deseasonalised, some seasonal effects appear to remain in the data. 
Therefore, the optimal value for m was tested at multiples of 4. These results are 
presented in the first five columns of Table 4.2. Note that the optimal lag length 
differs greatly across samples. In particular, for large firms and for firms with bond 
ratings, the optimal value of m is very high. Indeed, for firms with bond ratings, 
the regressors are still jointly significant at m  =  32 (regressions with higher values 
of m  were not run).
W ith the exception of the group consisting of large firms, the choice of lag length 
was the first value of m  for which the Wald statistic was insignificant at the 5% 
level. For large firms, m — 32 was the chosen specification. Given the optimal 
choice of lag length, three specification tests were run: (i) the m l statistic which 
tests for first-order serial correlation, (ii) the m 2  statistic which tests for second- 
order serial correlation, and (iii) the Sargan statistic. The asymptotic distribution 
of both the m l and m2 statistics is standard normal (Arellano and Bond (1991)). 
The Sargan statistic is distributed x 2> with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of identification restrictions less the number of parameters to be estimated. The 
estimates reported in table 4.2 refer to the regressions with the optimally chosen 
value of m. Given that equation (4.18) is first differenced, the residuals from the 
regression should display negative first-order serial correlation and no second-order 
serial correlation. This is true for all samples. The Sargan statistic could only be 
computed for two of these regressions. In both cases its value indicates the validity 
of the instruments . 1 3
13When there are more instruments than cross-section units DPD uses Generalised Inverses 
to compute the Sargan statistic. In all cases these were very unstable. Sargan statistics were 
computed for all lag lengths. In all cases where generalised inverses were not used the test statistic  
indicated that the instruments were valid.
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4.4 .4  F in an c in g  C o n stra in ts : T h e  G ra n g e r C au sa lity  T est
If financing constraints bind in every period, the model presented above predicts that 
log(CF / K)  will not Granger cause Alog(C'.F). This can be tested using a Wald test 
of the joint significance of the \og(CF/K)  terms in equation (4.18). The values of 
this test statistic are reported in table 4.3. Note that the degrees of freedom of 
the Wald test equals the value of m corresponding to the chosen VAR specification. 
However, the qualitative results of these Wald tests did not change when different 
lag lengths were used.
The results show that for two of the three groups of firms more likely to face bind­
ing financing constraints, namely small firms and firms with no bond rating, the 
\og(CF/K)  terms are jointly insignificant. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
financing constraint is binding in every period for these firms cannot be rejected. The 
A\og(CF)  series is exogenous in the system for these firms. As a result, log(CF) 
will not admit a Blanchard-Quah decomposition. As argued above, this is because 
transitory shocks to cash flow are being used to finance investment, which will have 
a permanent effect on cash flow. Thus, the transitory shock, 77, cannot be identified 
in the data for these groups of firms.
In constrast, for the entire sample and for the samples of large firms and firms with 
bond ratings, the log(CF / K)  terms are jointly significant. The null hypothesis is 
clearly rejected for these firms. This does not necessarily mean that none of these 
firms are financially constrained. However, it is possible to perform a Blanchard- 
Quah decomposition on cash flow for firms in these samples, and thereby identify 
the transitory shock, 77.
Unlike the bond rating criterion, the commercial paper rating criterion does not 
identify constrained firms. The null hypothesis is rejected for the samples of firms 
both with and without a commercial paper rating. In this sample, 24 firms that 
have a bond rating do not have a commercial paper rating, whereas only 6  firms 
which have a commercial paper rating do not have a bond rating. If the 24 firms 
with bond ratings are removed from the sample of firms without commercial paper
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ratings, the null hypothesis again fails to be rejected (the Wald test statistic of the 
joint significance of the log(C F /K )  terms is 19.94 and x?rit(16) =  26.3).
4.5 Conclusions
The main criticism of the existing literature on financing constraints is that the 
most predominant testing procedure does not directly test a null hypothesis that 
financially constrained firms exist. As a result, all the evidence compiled in this 
literature is based on reduced-form regressions. A structural object which can be 
used to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms, the supply shock to 
a firm’s internal finance, remains unidentified by this procedure. Consequently, it is 
not possible to ascertain the role this shock plays in determining a firm’s investment 
behaviour.
This paper has addressed that criticism by constructing a model of investment from 
which a direct test of the existence of financially constrained firms can be derived. 
The model itself is able to explain a high investment-cash flow sensitivity without 
having to appeal to financing constraints. The test derived from this model is based 
upon the observation that when a firm is financially constrained, and the constraint 
is always binding, then the firm’s cash flow series is an exogenous process. In 
contrast, the cash flow series is endogenous when the firm is unconstrained. These 
results imply that testing for the existence of financially constrained firms can be 
done via a Granger causality test. Thus not only is this a direct test of financing 
constraints, it is easily implemented as well.
The test was performed on a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms, sampled at a quar­
terly frequency between 1980 and 1992. The results show that in both the samples 
of small firms and of firms without bond ratings, the null hypothesis fails to be re­
jected. However, the null hypothesis is rejected for large firms and firms with a bond 
rating. Thus, it can be concluded that firms in the first two samples were financially 
constrained. This result is identical to the results reported in the existing literature.
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However, because the results in this paper are based on a direct, structural test, 
they are not subject to the same criticisms.
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Table 4.1: Presence of U nit R oots
Cash Flow Capital Stock CF/K
1% 206 - -
Cash Flow 5% 163 - -
10% 134 - -
1% 164 1% 265 -
Capital Stock 5% 110 5% 235 -
10% 89 10% 218 -
1% 49 1% 113 1% 144
CF/K 5% 55 5% 137 5% 197
10% 60 10% 148 10% 229
Cash Flow, Capital Stock: Number of firms which fail to reject the null. 
Cash F low /C apital Stock Ratio: Number of firms which reject the null. 
Off diagonals: Number o f firms satisfying both conditions.
Critical values (t= 2 5 ): -4.38 (1%), -3.6 (5%), -3.24 (10%).
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20 24 28 32
m l m2 Sargan D.F.
Full 5.29 3.31 - - - -6.1** 1.11 1.85 2219
Small 2.95 0.95 - - - -4.39** -1.19 - 576
Large 4.2 17.06** 12.43** 8.06* 1.37 -2.98** -0.016 - 490
No Bond 4.71 0.32 - - - -5.1** -0.08 - 1422
Bond 21.78** 28.83** 15.74** 8.48* 7.58* -4.42** 0.27 - 283
No CP 1.03 1.11 - - - -5.22** 0.81 0.54 1072
CP 2.78 15.81** 0.87 - - -2.68** 0.021 - 581
** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level.
Table 4.3: Granger Causality Tests
Sample Firms Wald (df)
Full 164 45.58** (20)
Small 40 21.85 (16)
Large 124 141.28** (32)
No Bond 86 22.73 (16)
Bond 78 204.1** (32)
No CP 104 49.54** (20)
CP 60 148.74** (24)
** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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4 .A Appendix
4.A .1 P roof of Proposition 4.2.1
To prove the existence of a solution to the Bellman equation as well as part (i) of 
Proposition 4.2.1, it must be shown that the following three conditions axe satisfied:
1. The state space 3ft++ x 3ft++ C 3ft2 is a convex cone with Borel subsets.
2. The correspondence T : 3ft++ —► 3ft++ is nonempty, compact valued, and con­
tinuous. For any K  E 9R++,/ E F(K) implies k I  E T (k K ), all k > 0. For
some d E (0,/?"1), \I\ < d \K \, all /  E r(AT), all K  E 3ft++.
3. The reward function i?(/, K, 0; fj) := rjYI(K,0) — I  — <j>(i,K) is continuous. 
.../?(•,•,•) is homogeneous of degree 1. For some 0 < B  < oo, \R(I, K,0)\ <
B(\I\ +  \K\ +  |0|), all ( /,  K,0)  E A, where A is the graph of T.
The first condition is satisfied by definition of the state space. Given the assump­
tions about the cost-of-adjustment function, the correspondence describing the set 
of feasible choices for I  can be written as T(Ar) =  [—dK, dK] without loss of gen­
erality. Thus, the second condition follows under the assumption that d lies in the 
interval (0,/?-1). Finally, since the reward function is homogeneous of degree 1 in all 
three arguments, it can at most grow linearly, which implies that the boundedness 
condition in (iii) is met.
Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to show that there exists a unique 
solution to the Bellman equation (4.4) in the space of functions /(x ,y )  : 9£++ x 
—> 3ft that are linearly homogeneous, and that this solution equals the supremum 
function defined by equation (4.3). It can also be shown that the optimal policy 
correspondence associated with the solution to the Bellman equation is compact­
valued, u.h.c, and homogeneous of degree 1, (i.e. I  E G(K,0) implies that XI E 
G(Xk, A0), all A >  0.)
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To show part (ii), first note that the reward function is strictly increasing in K  and
0. Let H (X )  represent the space of functions f ( x , y )  : 3ft++ x 3ft++ -* 3ft that are 
linearly homogeneous. H '(X )  C H (X ),  the subspace of weakly increasing linearly 
homogeneous functions is closed. Therefore, by a corollary to the Contraction Map­
ping Theorem it suffices to show that the Bellman operator, T, implicitly defined by 
equation (4.4), maps elements of H '(X)  into H " (X ), the set of strictly increasing 
linearly homogeneous functions. Since the reward function is strictly increasing in K  
and 0, and the feasibility correspondence is monotone this follows straightforwardly.
The proof of part (iii) is similar to that of part (ii). The subspace of linearly 
homogeneous functions weakly concave in their first argument, C '(X)  C  H (X )  is 
closed. Since the reward function is strictly concave in K , it follows that T  maps 
elements of C '(X )  into C "(X ), the set of linearly homogeneous functions which are 
strictly concave in their first argument.
To prove part (iv), note that the solution to the Bellman equation, V(*, 0), is strictly 
concave in its first argument, and r (A ) is a convex set for all K. Thus, it follows 
that G(-,0) is a continuous (single-valued) function.
Finally, since the return function, R , is concave and continuously differentiable in 
K  and 6, and since the assumptions on the adjustment costs function ensure that 
there is always an interior solution, it follows that the value function is differentiable 
with respect to K.
4 .A .2 P roof of Proposition  4.2.2
The law of motion for A;, g(k,p),  is given by,14
k’ =  (4.19)
A4
14The law of motion is a function of next periods realization of the shock p 1. Since p  is i.i.d. the 
prime is dropped for notational convenience. Also for notational convenience, it is assumed that
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Together with the density function for the exogenous shock, (£(//), this defines a 
transition function on the state space x [ju, /x] with the Borel algebra. Call this 
transition function P.
The first part of this proof is to show there exists a unique set S  := [A, k] C 9£++ 
which is ergodic. As a first step, it can be shown that g(k,fi)  is strictly increasing 
in k. Suppose that io and ko satisfy the first order condition (3.14). Consider an 
increase in k to k \ . Suppose the firm decreases i so as to entirely offset the increase 
in A;. In other words i\ is set such that
*1 —
(1 -f io)k0 — k\
k\
=> k\i\ — koio = k0 -  A?i,
koio > M i,
io > *i>
^ ( io ) > i>'{ii).
(4.20)
This implies that i\ is not optimal and that the optimal choice of investment, i*(A;i) < 
t*i. A similar argument can be made for k\ < ko. Therefore, g(k,fi) is strictly 
increasing in k. Since i(k) is strictly decreasing, g(k,p)  is strictly concave. To show 




=  l h n V - f 1 ( / 3 ( I M A ,  6) -  « * ( / ,  A )  +  * , ( / ,  A ) ) )
=  a,
where := i>'(i). The first line follows from the first-order condition, and the
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second from the Euler equation. The third line follows from: (i) limA4.o !!/*-(A, 6) =  
oo, (ii) limAio ^ k { I , A) =  -o o , (iii) limAio A) =  oo, and (iv) lim^oo ip'(i) =  a. 
The restrictions on p  ensure that gk(0,p) > 1.
This implies that for each p E [p, p] there exists a unique fixed point k satisfying 
k  =  g(k,p).  At that point 1 -\-i(k) = p , and the slope gk(k,p) =  1 -\-i'(k)k < 1 since 
i'(k) < 0. Therefore each fixed point is stable.
Let k be the fixed point associated with /J, and k with p. It is straightforward to 
show that for any k E S, k' G S. Moreover, the same is not true of any proper 
subset [c, d] C S. Therefore, S  is ergodic. Since any k < k  implies k' > k, and any 
k > k implies k' < k, S  is unique.
That S  is a unique ergodic set has two implications. First it implies that assumption 
12.1 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) is satisfied for S. Second, it implies that 
if there exists a unique invariant measure, A* under P , where P  is the transition 
function P  restricted to S  x [p.,p\, then A* is the unique invariant measure under P.
We will show that P  is monotone and has the Feller property. It then follows from 
theorems 12.10 and 12.12 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) that A* exists and 
is unique.
A
First define P  in terms of the density function (j>.
P(q , (—oo, x)) =  Pr{A/ <  x \ k =  q},
=  Pr{ (i± « 4
=  P r ( „ > (1 +  ^ ) ) g } ,
=  1 - $
X
(1 + i(q))q
where $  is the distribution function for p. Let ^(a:) be the density function associ-
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It can be seen from the above equation that if <£(•) is continuous then P  has the 
Feller property. P  is monotone if for any 6, c E [/c, k] with b > c, the probability
A A
measure P(6, •) dominates P(c, •), or equivalently,
J h(x)P(b,dx) > J  h(x)P(c,dx ), (4.22)
for any bounded, increasing function h(z). Rewriting the above equation using the 
density function gives,
(< I± p ) * (<l±p!f) * (ILtiM)f) *,
where x =  (1 -f i(x))x/jt  and x =  (1 +  i(x ))x /p .  Defining z = (1 +  i{q))q/x  and 
changing variables in the integration allows the above equation to be rewritten as.
/ >  « , ) *  >  j y  ( a + i t t )
The last inequality follows from the fact that (l+ i(6 ))6  >  (1 +  i(c))c and that h(x) is
  A
increasing. Therefore, P  is monotone. Note that because the bounds of integration 
have been switched, this cancels the negative sign arising from the change of variable.
□
4.A .3 P roof of Proposition  4.2.3
Since the only difference between the constrained and unconstrained problems is 
the feasibility correspondence, extending the proof of proposition 4.2.1 to the con­
strained problem relies on showing the feasibility correspondence defined by equation 
(4.7) satisfies the same conditions as the feasibility correspondence for the uncon­
strained problem.
A
To define the feasibility correspondence for the constrained problem, first let F ( / ,  K)  =  
I  +  \]/(/, K).  Since the function F  is homogeneous of degree one let f ( I / K )  =
A__________________________ ___
F ( I / K , 1 ). The function /  is strictly convex with a global minimum at b < 0. Let­
ting m  =  / - 1  over [6 , oo) and n =  / - 1  over (—0 0 , 6 ), we can write the financing
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constraint as,
n{r,,U(l,et/K, ) )Kt < I, < m(r,tH(l ,$t/ K t))Kt. (4.23)
Equation (4.23) defines the feasibility correspondence for the constrained problem, 
which can be written as,
r (K,9,v)  = [n(r,U(l ,e/K))K,  m(r,H(l ,e/K))K].
We need to show that T(K, 0, 77) is
1 . non-empty and compact valued,
2 . continuous in K , 9, and 77,
3. increasing in K  and 0,
4. homogeneous of degree one in K  and 9,
5. convex in K  and 9.
Items (i) - (iv) are easily derived from the properties of m(-) and n(-). Note that 
since n(x) <  0 for all x E (—0 0 , b) and m(x) > 0 for all x  E [6 , 0 0 ) item (iii) implies 
that n (‘)K  is decreasing in K  and 0, and that m (')K  is increasing in K  and 6. 
To prove item (v) it is sufficient to show that n ( ')K  is convex and that m (-)K  is 
concave in K  and 0. The Hessian of m (-)K  is given by
a2 d2 AO2 A6
dK2 dKdO K3 ‘ K2
d2 d2 AO A
dedK 392 K2 K
where
A = 77 {m//(-)n2(*, •) 2 ?7 4- 77i/(-)n22(*, •)} •
Over the interval [6,0 0 ), / '  > 0 and / "  > 0 which implies that m! >  0 and m" < 0. 
Since n 22 < 0, A  is negative and the Hessian is therefore negative semi-definite. 
Similar arguments can be made for the function n(-)K. □
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I*(K,0o) + *{I*(K,0o)9K)£
K
Figure 4.1: E xistence of k{rf)
4.A .4  P roof of Lem m a 4.2 .4
To prove the first part of the lemma, consider figure 4.1. For a given value of 0, 
0o, desired investment I* is decreasing in K.  There is a value of K , K , such that 
I*(K ,60) = 0. Since =  0, I* (K t 0o) +  $ ( /* (£ ,  0„), K )  =  0. For all K  < K ,
I * > 0. Moreover, \J/(I*(K, 0o), K )  is strictly decreasing and convex in K .  Since 
II(K,0)  is strictly increasing in K ,  and 11(0,0o) =  0, there exists a value of A , Ko, 
such that I*{Ko,0o) +  $ ( /* ( tfo,0o), #o) =  At/II^o,0o).
The functions /*, II, and are homogeneous of degree one. Consider 9\ =  60o, 
for any b > 0. We know there exists a unique K\ E (0,1^) such that I*(K i,0 i)  +  
S&(I*(Ki,01 ), K\)  =  \fjU (Ki,0i).  Due to the linear homogeneity of these functions 
this equation is satisfied for K\ =  bKo. Therefore, for each rj E [77,77] there exists a 
unique k , £(77) =  Kq/Qq, such that such that Xr}Tr(k(r}))/k(rj) = i(k(r])) +  i>(i{k(rj))), 
and for k < k(r/), Xr)7r(k)/k < i(k ) -f i/>(i(k)).
The function k(rj) is decreasing in rj. Its lowest value will therefore be k(rj). The 
financing constraint will always be binding for k < k(rj). We now want to show 
that there exists a A such that the upper support of the distribution of k in the
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constrained problem, kc is less than k < k(jf). To do so, we assume that the lower 
bound of the support for the distribution of p, p >  1. This is an assumption which 
has be made in the proof of Proposition 4.2.5, the stationarity of the constrained 
problem. This implies that 0t+i > 0t, Vt. Consequently, the firm’s demand for 
new capital will always be positive. So these firms will always be growing. As 
was discussed earlier in the chapter, growing firms are of particular interest in this 
analysis. First, growing firms may appear to be constrained because the presence 
of a non-stationary shock may lead to a rejection of some of the predictions of the 
standard formulation of the Adjustment Costs model. Second, in those studies that 
report growth rates, it is usually found that firms classified a priori as constrained 
have a higher average growth rate.
When the firm is constrained, and rj = rj, the investment function is implicitly 
defined by the equation,
\f}ir(k)/k = i + tl>(i). (4.24)
Now consider the fixed point of the law of motion for k corresponding to p,
, _  ( 1  +  it)kt
Kt+l — ------------ •
n
Since this fixed point corresponds to the lower bound of the support of p, it will be
the upper bound of the support for k , which will be called kc. At kCi 1  +  it = p.
Therefore, we can write equation (4.24) as
Xfj7v(k)/k = p — 1 + ^ (p  — 1 ).
The left-hand side is decreasing in both k and A, and lim ^o  rr(k)/k =  oo. If we 
decrease A, k  must be increased to satisfy this equation. Therefore, for a given p, 
there exists a A G (0 , 1 ) such that the k which satisfies the above equation, kc < k(ri).
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4 .A .5 P roof of Proposition 4.2.5
The proof of this Proposition follows the same argument as that of the proof of 
Proposition 4.2.2. Therefore, we need to show that
1. The law of motion for k' is increasing and strictly concave.
2. The derivative of the law of motion at k =  0 is greater than 1.
3. The transition function for the constrained problem is monotone.
Since we are focusing on the case where the firm is growing the law of motion is
h, ( l+m(A*fft)) fc
where m(-) is the function which defines the upper bound of the feasibility correspon­
dence for investment in the constrained problem. The first and second derivatives 
are given by the expressions,
r)n(k)
and
= I L»(.) +m (Tp, n'l[k) >.
Since m"(-) < 0 and n"(k) < 0 the second derivative is negative. Taking limits of 
the first equation gives,
lim iU ' =Ho dk p’
and
lim S r k '  = —.
H°o ok pi
Since the first derivative is continuous and decreasing, it must be positive ev­
erywhere. Note that a stationary solution to this problem requires that [p,fi\ G 
(1,1 +  a).
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These results imply that there is a unique ergodic set for k in the constrained 
problem. Each element of that set can be represented as a fixed point of the law of 
motion corresponding to a particular value of p. Define S  := [kc? kc], where kc is the 
fixed point corresponding to p  and kc is the fixed point corresponding to p.
A A   A
Let Pc be the transition function defined on Sc x [p^p]. To show that Pc is monotone, 
initially fix 77 =  77. Then,
Pc((a, 77), ( - 0 0 , x)) =  P r{k ' < x | k =  a, 77 =  77},
(l+g(M4))aj
Using the same arguments as in the proof for the unconstrained problem, it can be 
shown that for each 77 € [77, 77] , Pc((a, 77), •) dominates Pc((6,7 7 ), •), for any a, 6 E Sc 
such that a > b. Since this is true for every 77 it follows that Pc(a, •) dominates 
Pc(6, •), for any a, b € Sc such that a >  6, (i.e. the transition function not conditioned 
on 77). □
=  1 - $
Chapter 5
Conclusions
There is a large empirical literature on financing constraints and investment. The 
papers in this literature have performed several different tests of financing con­
straints on many different datasets. The impact of financing constraints has been 
examined not only on physical capital investment, but also on investment in inven­
tories, working capital, and R&D. With few exceptions, the studies in this literature 
have found very similar results which have been interpreted as evidence that there 
exist some firms which are financially constrained.
Chapter 2 is an application of several of these tests to a sample of UK firms. The 
sample was stratified into innovative and non-innovative groups, and several invest­
ment regressions were run. The data for both groups of firms rejected the restrictions 
implied by the structural equations from the Adjustment Costs model. ^However, 
cash flow was found to be a more important determinant of the investment be­
haviour of innovative firms^ Moreover, this result was found in all of the investment 
regressions that were run. In keeping with the existing literature, this result was 
interpreted as evidence that innovative firms are financially constrained.
In the Introduction some of the weaknesses inherent in the existing tests of the fi­
nancing constraints literature are discussed. Existing structural tests are based on 
the necessary conditions of the Adjustment Costs model of physical capital invest­
ment. These conditions are derived under several assumptions, one of which is the
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assumption of perfect capital markets. Consequently, this methodology tests a joint 
hypothesis which is comprised of all of these assumptions. The main weakness of this 
methodology is that when the data rejects the joint hypothesis, as, for example, was 
found in Chapter 2, it is not possible to ascertain which of the assumptions has been 
violated. Moreover, once the structural equations have been rejected, they can no 
longer be given a structural interpretation. Therefore, one is left only with reduced- 
form evidence to support the argument that the source of rejection is the violation 
of the perfect capital markets assumption. However, inference about the validity of 
an economic model cannot be based on a comparison of reduced-form coefficients, 
as has been commonly done in the financing constraints literature. Such a testing 
methodology is open to several strong criticisms, one of which can be understood as 
a version of the Lucas critique.
In Chapter 4 a new test of financing constraints which is not subject to these crit­
icisms is developed and implemented. In that chapter, a model of physical capital 
investment is built by introducing several modifications to the Adjustment Costs 
model. From this model, a vector moving average representation for two observable 
variables was derived. It was shown that, when a financing constraint is imposed 
on this model which is assumed to bind in every period, this places a testable re­
striction on the moving average representation. As this restriction was explicitly 
derived from an economic model, the test is structural and therefore is free from 
the criticisms made of reduced-form tests. Moreover, the test is direct insofar as 
one of the assumptions in its null hypothesis is that capital markets are imperfect. 
Therefore, this test is also free from the criticism made of existing structural tests. 
Finally, the test takes the form of a simple Granger causality test, and thus is easily 
implemented.
The new test was run on a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms. The sample was 
stratified using three different criteria: firm size, existence of a bond rating, and 
existence of a commercial paper rating. The results show that the null hypothesis 
that firms are financially constrained failed to be rejected for both the sample of 
small firms, and the sample of firms without bond ratings. For the sample of large
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firms, and of firms with bond ratings, the null hypothesis was decisively rejected. 
These are precisely the same results that have been reported in many papers in the 
financing constraints literature. That these results have been replicated using a test 
that is both structural and direct greatly strenthens their original interpretation as 
evidence of financing constraints. For both firms with and without a commercial 
paper rating, the null hypothesis was rejected. However, 28 firms which did not have 
a commercial paper rating did have a bond rating. When they were excluded from 
the sample of firms without commercial paper ratings, the null hypothesis failed to 
be rejected for this group.
Chapter 3 modeled the impact of financing constraints on inventory investment. The 
aim of that chapter was to use financing constraints to explain the excess variance of 
production puzzle. This is the widely observed fact that the variance of production 
exceeds that of sales. The intuition behind the general model was illustrated with 
an example. In that example, the financing constraint is binding only after low sales 
realizations. This forces the firm to produce less than what it has sold and what 
has depreciated from its stock of unsold goods. After higher sales realizations, the 
financing constraint is not binding. This permits the firm to produce more than 
what has been sold and has depreciated. Thus, in this example and in the general 
model, underproduction is associated with low sales realisations, and overproduction 
is associated with medium and high sales realisations. In this way the financing 
constraint causes the production distribution to be a mean-preserving spread of the 
sales distribution, thereby explaining the excess variance of production puzzle.
In addition to providing a theoretical explanation of this puzzle, the model of Chap­
ter 3 delivers several other predictions. One is that inventory investment and sales 
are positively correlated. Another is that the sales process is positively serially cor­
related despite the fact that the underlying demand process is not. Both of these 
predictions are observed in data. Moreover, the second prediction suggests a way 
in which financing constraints may act as a propagation mechanism for aggregate 
output fluctuations. Empirically, inventory disinvestment accounts for a very large 
proportion of declines in the aggregate output of both the US and UK during reces­
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sions.
There are several other explanations of the excess variance of production puzzle. 
The puzzle has such widespread empirical support that it is difficult to imagine that 
it can be explained exclusively by one of the competing theories. A prediction of the 
model in Chapter 3 that distinguishes it from the other explanations is tha t sales 
which do not affect the firm’s expectation of future demand nevertheless affect its 
inventory investment. This is a prediction which is common to models of investment 
under financing constraints. The identification of such sales is precisely the same 
problem that lies at the center of the controversy surrounding existing tests in the 
empirical financing constraints literature. A potential avenue of future research is 
the use of the methodology developed in Chapter 4 to test the inventory investment 
model developed in the third chapter.
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